

Mark Edward Lewis. *Writing and Authority in Early China*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. vii, 544 pp. Hardcover \$92.50, ISBN 0-7914-4113-x. Paperback \$31.95, ISBN 0-7914-4114-8.

In more than one sense, Mark Edward Lewis' *Writing and Authority in Early China* is a monument of scholarship. First of all, its 544 pages constitute the most comprehensive, illuminating, and intellectually challenging tour de force through the early Chinese textual tradition that has been published so far in any of the major sinological languages. It is by all standards the best available introduction to this tradition and mandatory reading for anybody interested in early China. Whatever transmitted text of early Chinese intellectual history one may think of, chances are high that Mark Lewis has dealt with it somewhere on these pages.

The textual layout betrays an effort to force a massive text into a still handy format, a commendable effort that nevertheless does not come without a price for the reader: Lewis' often brilliant and imaginative prose inspires numerous notes that one wishes to put into the margins—if only there were any margins of reasonable space to accommodate them. The tightness of print correlates with a strictness of organization. The seven chapters of almost identical length are headed by carefully composed titles that suggest an overall coherence of the topic under discussion: following the introduction, we are taken through "Writing the State," "Writing the Masters," "Writing the Past," and "Writing the Self"; these chapters are followed by "The Political History of Writing," "The Natural Philosophy of Writing," "The Encyclopedic Epoch," and "The Empire of Writing." Each chapter closes with a conclusion that in its last sentences leads directly to the next part of the book. The titles of the chapter subheadings corroborate this vision of neat coherence. For example, chapter 3, "Writing the Past," is composed of "The Past in Speeches," "The Past in Political Philosophy," "The Past in Cosmogony," and "The Past in Chronicle"; chapter 5, "The Political History of Writing," is structured into "The Mythology of Fu Xi," "The Mythology of the Duke of Zhou," and "The Mythology of Confucius"; chapter 7, "The Encyclopedic Epoch," deals with "Totality and Truth" and "Canon and Commentary," followed by "State-Sponsored Compendia" and another coherent set of topics: "Sima Qian and Universal History," "Sima Xiangru and Universal Poetry," and "The Liu Family and the Universal Library." The last chapter of the book before its overall "Conclusion" is, as noted above, "The Empire of Writing," and it consists of "Establishment of the Canon" and "Triumph of the Canon."

I list these titles at length not just to provide a convenient survey of this work's phenomenal breadth but to point to its very nature: in this magnum opus as well as in his other writings Mark Lewis emerges as a system builder, and if

there are, in Karlgren's words, any "systematizing" texts in early China, they are all easily outdone by their modern interpreter. In short, we witness a magnificent attempt to reconstruct a unified vision of early Chinese textual—and not only textual—culture. The ambitious enterprise is successful to the extent that one cannot help asking whether this universe of early China is actually a reconstruction or instead more of a brilliant and highly imaginative construct¹—a point to which I will return below.

Writing and Authority in Early China is also a monument in a different sense: its 130 pages of notes, followed by thirty pages of "Works Cited," summarize an impressive body of modern scholarship written in Chinese, Japanese, English, French, and German. One of the book's noteworthy strengths is the fact that its author commands "Western" scholarship not as a monolingual domain—a matter of course but regrettably not, or no longer, common standard in Chinese studies, and therefore ever more important as one of the touchstones of comprehensive scholarship. Through the broad scope of its references, the book effectively, though perhaps inadvertently, seems to assume the gesture of closing an epoch—in this respect not that of early Chinese textuality but that of the recent modern scholarship related to it. Published at the time of an important junction in early Chinese studies—almost a generation after the field has reinvented itself inside and outside China and is now setting new standards in academic rigor and international orientation²—*Writing and Authority in Early China* is the first single-handed Western endeavor to encapsulate the knowledge of early Chinese textual history in one synthesizing account. No review can possibly do justice to the enormous wealth of facts assembled and perspectives drawn by Mark Lewis; students of any aspect of traditional (not only early) China must read this work, and certainly more than once, to absorb all that it has to offer. In what follows, I will not foolishly attempt to summarize this awe-strikingly rich and detailed book (which, in fact, carries its own summaries at the end of each chapter). Instead, I will selectively point to a number of issues that directly arise from Lewis' account and that bear on the phenomenon of the text in early China.

Lewis states his key thesis in the "Introduction." Having outlined the role of writing as "fundamental to the transformation of authority in the Warring States period," he notes:

However, the culminating role of writing in the period, and the key to its importance in imperial China, was the creation of parallel realities within texts that claimed to depict the entire world. Such worlds created in writing provided models for the unprecedented enterprise of founding a world empire, and they underwrote the claims of authority of those who composed, sponsored, or interpreted them. One version of these texts ultimately became the first state canon of imperial China, and in this capacity it served to perpetuate the dream and the reality of the imperial system across the centuries. . . . I will argue in this book that the ultimate importance of writing to the Chinese empire and

imperial civilization did not derive from its administrative role. Rather the Chinese empire, including its artistic and religious versions, was based on an imaginary realm created within texts. These texts, couched in an artificial language above the local world of spoken dialects, created a model of society against which actual institutions were measured. (p. 4)

This important and far-reaching insight is invoked throughout the following chapters, which cover the historical period from the late Shang (thirteenth–eleventh centuries B.C.) through the Western Han (202 B.C.–A.D. 9). The main body of the work is devoted to the Warring States period (453–221 B.C.), for which Lewis has already established his authority;³ next in emphasis comes the early empire. These decisions, which present the earlier periods as “the archaic background” (pp. 14–18) and the institution of the empire as the final result of Warring States political and textual developments, are justifiable by the fact that the fifth through the third centuries was indeed a most fruitful time of intense production of texts and thought, writing the visions of the past, and prefiguring the political discourses of the empire. On the other hand, given the enormous amount of oracle-bone and bronze inscriptions, one would have hoped for more than the few remarks that the author offers on the Shang, the Western Zhou (ca. 1045–771 B.C.), and the Spring and Autumn period (722–481 B.C.). In very briefly discussing these two earliest attested forms of Chinese writing, Lewis had to decide between two competing approaches: one that regards these writings as plain historical documents and the other that interprets them as religiously used and defined texts. For both bones and bronzes, Lewis has chosen the second explanation, and from here he draws a continuous line into the textual practice of Warring States times. While I am convinced that his choices are correct, and that they are indeed significant for the understanding of Warring States and early imperial practices of writing, I would propose that strong additional evidence could have been adduced to them, if only to strengthen the very basis of the author’s argument on the nexus between ritual and text.

Following Lothar von Falkenhausen’s argument, Lewis notes that in early Zhou times, “wood and bamboo documents were stored in archives for use by the living, while elements of them were reported to the ancestors through inscriptions inside sacrificial vessels” (p. 17). This is most likely correct, but the interesting and important enterprise only begins right here. How were these thousands of texts inside the bronze vessels “reported” to the ancestors? Did the ancestors read, or did they listen? Did they descend to the texts, or did the texts travel upward? Are these just written texts, or are they texts for oral performances that before or after their recitation were cast into bronze? How should we, in terms of cultural concepts, describe the transformation of archival documents into announcements and prayers directed to the spirits? What precisely should we envision as the particular power of the written—versus the merely spoken—text? What conclusions can we draw from the material aspects of these writings: the resources and tech-

nological expertise that went into them, their visual arrangement, their calligraphic style? What is the relation between these writings and those few other texts that we traditionally (and tentatively) date to Western Zhou and Spring and Autumn times, that is, the early layers of the *Changes* (*Yi* 易), the *Odes* (*Shi* 詩), and the *Documents* (*Shu* 書)? And how, finally, should we perceive the difference between an inscribed and an uninscribed bronze vessel or bell, if writing should be so important for the success and completion of ancestral and other sacrifices?

Such questions bear directly on much of the Warring States and early imperial practice of writing and its relation to authority, and they could help to unveil important aspects of textuality in early China that have barely been explored. Moreover, since Lewis argues that with the early inscriptions of the archaic state, writing emerges “at the nexus of religious practice and political authority,” influencing “the forms it took and the roles it played in the formation of later, territorial states in the Warring States period” (p. 14), a close examination of some exemplary inscriptions would have been in place here. To complement Lewis’ terse account, a few remarks on the nature, structure, and ritual context of these writings may be appropriate and might suffice to illustrate the potential consequences of such an analysis. First of all, the phenomenon that writing in early China creates “parallel realities within texts to depict the entire world” arises directly from the earliest known uses of Chinese texts in ancestral sacrifices and divinations. Beginning with the oracle bones, these parallel realities are not descriptive but prescriptive; as David N. Keightley has noted, “An-yang was not Delphi, where the words of the Pythia had to be translated, frequently ambiguously, by priests. . . . The supernatural powers were given little opportunity to inspire new solutions. . . . The powers could not reveal themselves in unexpected ways. The supernatural responses were rigorously channeled.”⁴ With their “routine optimism,”⁵ which increased over time, in the form of emphatically positive crack notations, prognostications, and, occasionally, even verifications that the divined event had indeed taken place,⁶ the oracle-bone inscriptions are clearly concerned not with an “objective” but with an ideal memory to be selectively preserved as meaningful or even foundational for the present and future.⁷ Precisely the same is true for Western Zhou bronzes: according to Edward L. Shaughnessy, not one of more than fifty known inscriptions concerned with warfare ever mentions a defeat.⁸

Writing in these contexts is primarily concerned with control over history, both retrospectively and—in the case of the divinations—prospectively. It is an act of authority because it expresses the alliance of sovereignty and remembrance, not only preserving what must not be forgotten but, equally important, systematically forgetting what should never have happened.⁹ The bronze inscriptions, as much as they might appear as records of remembrance, are at least to some extent records of controlled oblivion, intended to eliminate memory—and this, to jump ahead into early imperial times, is still valid for the first emperor’s stele inscrip-

tions and the accompanying measures of burning competing archives and those historical writings that were freely circulating among the population. The nexus of writing and authority, I believe, is nowhere else more clearly identifiable than in those early inscribed texts that indeed are ancestral to Warring States and early imperial writings.

Both oracle-bone and bronze inscriptions hence make for rather poor historical archives, and this despite the enormous efforts and resources that the preparation and carving of the bones and plastrons as well as the casting of the bronzes required. What are we to make of the fact that in oracle bones the ancestors often are mentioned not by their actual names but only by their relative positions within the lineage, like father or mother, grandfather or grandmother, elder brother, and so on,¹⁰ which are unambiguous only from the perspective of the divining king but not from that of later generations? If the inscriptions were intended as enduring historical archives, one would necessarily expect designations that could still speak in an unmistakable way to posterity. We must assume that Shang kings understood this difference—so why were they not concerned? On the other hand, the apparent short-term validity of such texts is in stark contrast with the materiality of their writings: why invest such extraordinary amounts of labor into the preparation of texts that were so deficient as historical records if other materials like wood, and writing instruments like the brush, were readily available?

Very likely, the answer to such questions lies—to complement further Lewis' key thesis at its very foundation—in the ritual purpose of these texts and in the nexus of writing and authority. Carved into bones and plastrons and cast into bronze, the texts themselves assumed a material nature that is certainly not exhausted in the commonplace explanation that they were intended for long endurance. Much more important, they expressed the control over labor, resources, and technology as well as the prerogative of a unique style of representation that was able to speak to the spirits—in other words, they had political and religious authority. This is obviously the case with bronzes but no less true for oracle bones: not only were these extremely difficult to prepare, but the characters were also often arranged in approximate symmetry, they were carefully pigmented, and they were occasionally written in a large “display” style. In addition, they were often created in series, which means that for every single bone or shell, the same amount of labor had to be exerted.¹¹ None of these aesthetic efforts can be explained as being simply for archival purposes. While the inscriptions, on the one hand, appear as less than accurate historical records, they are, on the other, particularly powerful idealized records, being endowed with all the material resources available to the Shang and early Zhou elites. It is from this perspective that we should return to Lewis' basic thesis on the creation of a normative second reality in writing, and on the relation of the written text to a ritual performance in which these texts undoubtedly played their role.

If the inscriptions were indeed writings to be used in religious ceremonies, and were not primarily intended as historical records, why did they assume their pseudo-historical habitus at all? Why do oracle bones provide the date of the divination and the name of the diviner, and in addition mention the activities of the king in phrases like “The king, reading the cracks, said. . .”? Why do bronze inscriptions, in a very similar manner, give a date and mention explicitly the donor and dedication of the very bronze into which the text is inscribed? And why do sacrificial hymns like those of the *Shijing* 詩經 as well as those of Western Han times elaborately describe the efforts, beauty, and success of the very ritual performances of which they are themselves a part? I would propose that all these acts, running along a continuous thread through a full millennium of the early Chinese culture of writing, can be subsumed under the term of ritual self-referentiality, which I believe to constitute the very core of both ritualism and writing in early China and which corresponds largely to Lewis’ “creation of parallel realities” by duplicating on the linguistic level the ritual performance in which they played their role.¹² Whether mentioning the initial divinatory act on oracle bones or providing the “statement of dedication” in Zhou bronze inscriptions,¹³ specifying the act of inscribing the stone in Qin imperial stele inscriptions, or eulogizing the ancestral sacrifices in Zhou and Han ritual hymns,¹⁴ in all cases we witness the creation of a second linguistic reality that with its own authority seems to rule over the first “factual” one: a sacrificial performance was by definition successful, since—and only since—its own texts instantaneously eulogized the attendance, satisfaction, and appreciative response of the spirits. The presence of the spirits within and outside the human realm was entirely textual, from oracle-bone inscriptions through Western Han hymns.

While the practice of writing in originally ritual contexts must have been of considerable prestige, one might consider a more complementary interaction of text and ritual, with both of them being related to the exercise of authority. Not only was ritual semanticized, doubled, and instantaneously confirmed through written texts, but these texts of political representation were in turn sacralized through the overwhelming multimedia effects of their ritual performance, where the written text became interwoven with the smell of food and drink (when placed inside bronze vessels) and the sound of music (when placed on the outside of bronze bells) to be transmitted to the spirits. Most importantly, by its self-referential textual gesture, the ritual performance created, sacralized, and historicized itself:¹⁵ to praise, in strictly prescriptive terms, the successful toils of a sacrifice, with the spirits made present through nothing else but a speech act, and to identify the ritual participants not by their name (this would be plain historical thinking) but by their appropriate current role and status (as crucial in ritual-oriented thinking) meant nothing less than the confirmation of political legitimacy.

The self-referential and text-bound nature of early Chinese ritual practice is captured in the statement preserved in the *Xiaojing* 孝經 and much quoted in Han times: “To change the customs and alter the manners, nothing is superior to music; to tranquilize the powers above and to govern the people, nothing is superior to ritual.”¹⁶ Here, ritual and music—encompassing the texts of hymns and inscriptions—are envisioned as being simultaneously both the expression and the forces of effective government and cultural transformation. The ritual act as such was already what it represented through its written and performed textual media, namely the performance of exalted rulership; it was itself a “type of power.”¹⁷ In the famous words of the *Zuo zhuan* 左傳: “The great affairs of the state reside in the temple sacrifices and in the war sacrifices.”¹⁸

From these considerations, I would like to raise one question about the fundamental thesis of *Writing and Authority in Early China*: is the practice of writing indeed the foremost representation of authority—or, even more broadly, culture—in early China? Or does writing only gradually, and very slowly, attain its ultimate place of pride by emancipating itself from its earlier involvement in ritual practice?¹⁹ In other words: did writing indeed rule over ritual practice, or was it an important part within this practice? Do we overestimate the cultural status of writing simply because texts speak to us in a uniquely informative way that can never be rivaled by any non-textual materials? There is, of course, no doubt about the literacy of the Shang and early Zhou elites—but how much does this say about the actual status of the written text *relative to other modes of cultural (political, historical, religious) representation* in general, and about the generation of authority in particular?

From the classical examples of both ancient Greece and Egypt we know that a literate culture could for centuries be focused on a ritual practice where the efficacy even of the written text was primarily sought in its oral performance.²⁰ Concerning ancient Greece, Rosalind Thomas has noted: “Much if not all of the early writing put on stone was meant to represent statements which were to be uttered aloud, usually in verse: so here writing is the servant of the spoken word, a means of communicating what would usually be sung or said.” I would propose to apply this finding to Zhou bronze inscriptions. For several reasons, the text proper of a bronze inscription—which is, in the first place, a verbal composition—and the actual inscription into which it was transformed and as which it has been transmitted must clearly be distinguished as two separate entities, with the text being independent from its individual material carrier.

First, there is no one-to-one relation between a given text and its bronze carrier: a text could be partly or in its entirety repeated on several bronzes or divided across a set of them, especially on bells that were conceived not as singular items but as sets. Second, as it can be demonstrated in the example of the pre-imperial Qin bronzes, a text of an earlier bronze inscription could be maintained

and to a large extent reactivated for a new inscription even a century later, and even though the capital and its ancestral temple had been moved, with the earlier bronzes being left behind.²¹ Third, the visual arrangement of the inscriptions does not respect the intrinsic aesthetics of the text, especially their main structuring features of rhyme and meter; it is therefore clear that these elements must have been represented in a different way, and this most likely was in the form of oral performance. Remarkably enough, the practice of rhyming in Zhou bronze inscriptions became more regular over time,²² probably suggesting that the element of oral representation was not abandoned but continuously practiced, refined, and formalized in Eastern Zhou times. On this evidence, I wish to argue that bronze inscriptions were not primarily written but were essentially oral hymns that at a certain point became cast in bronze; they were intended not to be silently read but to be sung or recited—a practice testified to in early imperial writings.²³

I have indulged in this extensive excursus on preliminaries here before turning to the main body of *Writing and Authority in Early China* in order to show how much Lewis' discussion of Warring States and Han texts resonates with recent contextualizing analyses of China's earliest textual materials and their performative dimensions. Two interrelated questions can be raised to trace the development of the status of writing in early China. In which periods, and in which contexts, is the written text indeed the guiding form for such ritual utterances? And where, in turn, was the written version of a text only of secondary order, with its linguistic structure largely determined by the pragmatic dimension of performance? While Lewis never neglects to relate the development and early use of Chinese writing to religious thought and ritual practice, the one missing part in his otherwise impressive work is a close analysis of actual texts that genuinely belong to such practice, from the oracle bones down to Sima Xiangru's 司馬相如 (179–117 B.C.) *fu* 賦 (for the latter, see below). Such an analysis might have contributed to an even more sophisticated picture of early Chinese culture and its generation and expression of authority. A good example is the Spring and Autumn period covenant (*meng* 盟) texts from the state of *Jin* 晉, which, as Lewis points out,²⁴ can be seen as one of the origins of the later legal codes. These texts, written in black or red on small stone tablets, are remarkable in their extreme formularity, their numbers, and their performative use: although ultimately presented to the spirits and therefore buried in the earth, they were part of a ritual during which animals were sacrificed and their blood collectively drunk; moreover, the blood was smeared on the lips of the participants, who read out loud²⁵—that is, in an oral performance—the covenants through which rulers obliged themselves to each other, or inferiors to superiors.

Even if the ultimate authority of this dramatic ritual act should indeed be sought in the written text that was directed to the spirits (who would oversee the observance of the covenant and punish its transgressions), the authority of this

text did not rest solely in its written form but to a significant extent also in its ritual context and presentation. When Lewis contrasts the orality of the earlier oaths (*shi* 誓) with the written nature of the later covenants (p. 20) to propose a development toward the written codes of late Warring States and early imperial times, one may wonder how strict this borderline between the oral and the written word actually is, and how real its teleological implications are. Since Western Zhou bronze inscriptions had already carried legal contracts in a more narrow sense,²⁶ it seems that the covenants were more part of a continuous practice than markers of a particular late stage within the chronological development.

Dealing with the legal codes of late Warring States times, Lewis contributes important evidence from excavated texts to question the traditionally assumed dichotomy of “law” (*fa* 法) versus “ritual” (*li* 禮) as a principle of administrative and legal procedures. As it becomes clear from his discussion, all early legal systems, including that of the pre-imperial and imperial Qin state, were firmly rooted in traditional religious beliefs, ritual practices, and inherited social hierarchies. This conclusion not only challenges the validity of the “law versus ritual” discourse as we know it from the received textual tradition; it also supports reconsiderations of the Qin rule not as a mere terror regime but as a very traditional polity.²⁷ In turn, a highly original analysis of the *Zhouli* 周禮 shows how this “ritual” canon indeed blends ritual, legal (even “legalist”), and cosmological ideas into a comprehensive vision of “the state as a replica or image of the cosmos” (p. 48). In Lewis’ account, both the *Zhouli* and the excavated manuscripts turn into consistent evidence for the development of bureaucratic ideas and structures out of the ritual tradition—an idea that, again, does not start with Warring States texts but can be related to (and therefore supported by) the Shang ritual bureaucracy, which Keightley has been able to deduce from the oracle bones.²⁸

A somewhat problematic part of chapter 1 is the section on “Writing and the King” (pp. 35–42), which tries to encompass a broad range of issues. Starting out with the doctrine and practice of *xing ming* 形/刑名 (“performance and claims”) in relation to the broader issue of *zheng ming* 正名 (“rectifying the names”), the discussion moves on to the “inner cultivation” chapters of the *Guanzi* 管子 and techniques of meditation and world observation in general, from here to the ruler as “master of change,” who acts in response to the times, and finally leads to the issue of kingly processions and spirit journeys. While these various issues might be related, not all of them bear to the same extent on the issue of writing in relation to the authority of the ruler; moreover, the brief and highly imaginative synthesis does not always exhaust the genuine potential of its parts. The issue of “changing with the times,” for example, has long been regarded as a hallmark of “legalist” doctrine and as such fills our standard accounts of early Chinese thought.²⁹ It will be important for the discussion of the Qin legal code and its traditional background, although this connection does not surface in his account,

that Lewis relates this issue to the “Confucian” ideals of the model ruler, who changes his rites according to the times (p. 40). Apart from this, the key discourse in which this principle becomes fully developed is not on writing but on music: beginning in the Warring States period and fully accomplished in Han times, the ideal political history of the culture heroes of high antiquity becomes duplicated as an ideal cultural history of their musical creations. In this vision, the individual sages are credited with the creation of their own distinctive music. Continuing the genealogy of cultural accomplishment in its highest form, that is, music and dance, they define their own times by inventing their own musical forms to express the essence of their own virtuous power.³⁰

From this perspective, a discussion of music as one of the central means of political and religious representation could again raise questions about the centrality of the text in early Chinese culture. Perhaps more than other artifacts, bronze bells directly embodied authority and control over material and human resources as well as technological expertise, and since the late Warring States period, textual records even attribute to them a control over the cosmic order that was thought to be contained in their tonal system. (It should be noted, though, that exactly at this time the bells of the traditional type ceased to be made. Their standard tone designations nevertheless continued to be used for the corresponding sets of pitch pipes.) Such bells, it should be remembered, count in the thousands; buried in tombs over the centuries, the purpose of bells and other musical instruments³¹ was certainly more than simple entertainment. Apart from this, why do the earlier passages of the *Lunyu*, as argued by Van Zoeren and others, focus on the *Odes* not as texts (not to mention “writings”) but as musical pieces?³² Why does the “Great Preface” (“Da xu” 大序) develop the discussion of the *Odes* out of the earlier theory of music? Why does a *Mozi* 墨子 text, when attacking the *ru* 儒, take aim at their practice of ritual and music, and not at their particular—from a Mohist perspective certainly misguided—usage of texts (not to mention “writings”)?

Another portion of “Writing and the King” that might have benefited from more extensive treatment is the discussion of the first emperor’s tours of inspection, during which he erected inscribed stones on the top of sacred mountains. These journeys are not, as Lewis seems to suggest, *examples* of “the practice of ritual processions with accompanying inscriptions” (p. 41) but the *one and only* case of this. And although possibly related to meditation practices and trance journeys of their time, their genuine origins might be sought more fruitfully in Zhou rituals of territorial sovereignty, in particular the *wang* 望 sacrifices to the rivers and mountains that served to demarcate the realm under control. Moreover, the inscriptions—eulogizing the emperor’s achievements to the cosmic spirits—can be clearly traced back to earlier bronze inscriptions and their announcements of merits to the ancestors. It is undoubtedly crucial to include the emperor’s

cosmic journey and his written texts in a chapter on "Writing the State," but instead of referring to proto-Daoist meditation practices as well as to the "Li sao" 離騷 and Han writings of cosmic journeys, the argument would have found stronger support by considering the new writings in stone as transformations of the old ones in bronze, including all their implications of oral performance mentioned above.

Finally, the stele inscriptions bear on the issue of writing and authority in a very peculiar way. The idealized blueprint of the ruler's tour of inspection and his regulation of the cosmos is to be found in Shun's 舜 processions as described in the "Yaodian" 堯典 chapter of the *Shangshu* 尚書, which very likely went through the editorial hands of the Qin imperial erudites, as Lewis himself points out. Again, the interplay of text and ritual leads to a rather complex scenario: first, a new ritual of political expression was forged through the combination of two older and highly venerated practices, namely the spatial conquest symbolized in the tour of inspection and the announcement of merits to the ancestral spirits. Second, it was found necessary at least to edit, and maybe actually produce, a particular section right at the beginning of the long-cherished *Shangshu* that would have provided *in writing* the traditional background to, and the political legitimation for, the emperor's actual practice.

Chapter 2, "Writing the Masters," focuses on the nature of textual traditions (usually called "schools") and the generation and transmission of texts in the Warring States period. Again, Lewis offers new and, compared to conventional accounts, very different perspectives. Arguing that authoritative figures like Confucius, Mo Di, or Mencius are not the authors but the inventions of the texts attributed to them—and thus dissociating the authorship of the texts from the authority of their intrinsic speakers—he develops a scenario of teaching, learning, textual production, and textual transmission as concrete and lively social practices within defined groups of actors. Texts and "masters" did not exist by themselves but as creations that needed constant reproduction in the form of teaching and exegesis: "Thus the text, the master, and the disciples were inextricably bound together. Without the text there was no master and no disciples (beyond the lives of the individuals involved); without the master there was no authoritative text or transmitters of the text; and without the disciples the text was not written or transmitted, and the master vanished together with his teaching" (p. 58). In this scenario, the actual author is moved to the background while the group to whom the words of the master were taught and transmitted becomes the decisive factor for the existence of the text.

Differences in textual versions, collections of quotations, interpretations, and images of the master reflect factional disagreements among the disciples and teachers of later generations: "Thus by the late Warring States period many people offered different versions of Confucius' words and deeds" (p. 59). These

remarkable observations, plausible not only for the *Lunyu* 論語 but also for the *Mozi*, *Zhuangzi* 莊子, *Han Feizi* 韓非子, and other, even much later texts³³ where factional differences ultimately came to be compiled into one—*necessarily* inconsistent—work, provide a theory about the nature and structure of the philosophical texts that is able to explain their internal contradictions. At the same time, the philosophical practice of the fourth and third centuries is reconstructed as a lineage-centered debate that integrates multiple perspectives.

The strength of Lewis' argument becomes clear from several angles: it provides a model of textual production and transmission that transcends the artificially narrowed debate on "schools"; it accounts for ideological differences within the perceived textual (Confucian, Mohist, etc.) traditions and for borrowings among them, and as such can also be used to explain the notoriously eclectic text collections in Warring States and early imperial tombs; and its assumption of the textual and scholarly lineage, which generates the authority of the master as well as the position of its disciples, matches exactly the oldest, most enduring, and most effective production of authority in traditional China, namely ancestor worship. Without explicitly pointing to these correlations, Lewis has convincingly established the structural identity between ancestral and philosophical lineages, sacrificial worship, and exegetical transmission. The master and his legacy are invented and perpetuated in precisely the way ancestors are; the authority of his disciples in transmitting his words corresponds to the continuation of an ancestor's virtuous power through his descendants; and the act of making oneself a name (*ming* 名) by praising an ancestor in an inscription (*ming* 銘),³⁴ as described in the famous *Liji* 禮記 passage on the inscription of tripods, tallies the disciples' teaching of the master's thought. As an aside, one may note that there is no shortage of early texts mentioning disciples mourning for their master as one would mourn a father.

Another, equally original and important, analysis concerns the role of the scholarly lineages and individual teachers (or "schoolmen" as Lewis calls them) vis-à-vis the state. In a strong rebuttal of the conventional idea that the early "masters" gained authority and income from making themselves useful to the ruling houses of their times, Lewis proposes just the opposite: "all the masters claimed to be the unique holders of the secrets of kingship, and as such they claimed the ability to define the monarch and dictate his policies. From the perspective of the ruler, such claims would inevitably appear as a challenge or a threat" (p. 73). This is particularly true of the *ru* and the Mohists, who, as Lewis reiterates what others have pointed out earlier (and what probably needs to be said still many more times until it finally reaches the standard textbook accounts), were "the only traditions that formed disciplined associations and hence were recognized as schools in Warring States writings" (p. 69). Having laid open this fundamental tension between the state and the learned scholars of various textual

traditions, Lewis argues that the infamous measures proposed by Li Si 李斯 (d. 208 B.C.) and adopted by the Qin first emperor to suppress private learning among the population and to monopolize scholarship in the hands of the imperial erudites, were, for the first time, the state's response to this threat. While there can be no doubt about the opposition stance toward the state that the most prominent "masters," in this respect all led by Confucius, had self-consciously chosen (or that had been assigned to them by their disciples and textual traditions), the argument might need some historical differentiation.

It is, first of all, not exactly clear who the actual targets of the repressive acts of 213 and 212 B.C.—well-known under the historically incorrect formula *fen shu keng ru* 焚書坑儒, "burning the books and executing the Confucians"—actually were. While the early texts mention the "speeches of the hundred lineages" (*bai jia yu* 百家語) together with "songs" (*shi* 詩) and "documents" (*shu* 書),³⁵ Lewis conflates the term *bai jia* with "the masters" (*zhuzi* 諸子), an identification that is, as Petersen has convincingly shown, most likely incorrect.³⁶ We have no indication whatsoever that the philosophical "masters" would have been affected by the Qin proscription of private learning; in the words of Wang Chong 王充 (27–ca. 100): "Although the Qin were without the Way, they did not burn the [writings of the] philosophical masters (*zhuzi* 諸子)."³⁷

More likely, according to Petersen's analysis of the term *bai jia yu*, the Qin proscription affected writings that could be used to "criticize the present by invoking the past" (*yi gu fei jin* 以古非今), that is, through historical analogy. These texts, more than any of the more general philosophical works, directly challenged and threatened the new unified state by questioning its monopoly on defining the past. At the historical moment when the first emperor embarked on his tours of inspection and had his achievements carved into stones on what had been the sacred mountains of the former eastern states of the Zhou realm, he not only inscribed these natural sites with a sacralized distillate of history from the perspective of its ultimate victor, but he also transformed all the earlier subjects of pre-imperial history into objects of a teleological history of the Qin empire. Only logically, he not only destroyed all the former states' historical archives (as bemoaned by Sima Qian) but tried to control the circulation of those texts that were read most strongly as expressions of historical paradigms like *Shijing*-type "songs" and *Shangshu*-type "documents." Compared to these writings, the *zhuzi*, while also arguing in historical perspectives (see below), were texts of a lower order: they themselves quote "songs" and "documents" as sources of their own authority; their authority is therefore derivative, not primary, and their role is more that of a mediator (or "transmitter," as Confucius would have it) of the genuine fountains of historical truth. Moreover, beyond the more practical and very brief controversy about the creation of fiefdoms, we have no information

that any doctrinal issues, regardless of their ideological provenance, were at stake in Li Si's argument—another testimony to the relative irrelevance of the “masters.”

Of course, this clarification does not affect Lewis' main thesis that the scholarly lineages positioned themselves in principal opposition to the state. When the Qin summoned *ru* erudites from the former eastern states to serve at the imperial court and contribute their expertise in the ritual and textual tradition, they further fueled the discussion about “vulgar” (*su* 俗) versus “great” (*hong* 弘) or “real” (*zhen* 真) *ru*—a distinction both frequently and flexibly employed by third- and second-century B.C. scholars who thereby would argue either for or against an oppositional stance toward the state. Building upon the “opposition” thesis, one could further argue that the Qin's ultimate failure as a dynasty only strengthened the opposition stance, since those groups of textual *ru* scholars who had in part collaborated with the first empire (and had neutralized themselves as its potential opponents) at some time early in the Western Han now needed to relocate themselves and to reinvent their identity and integrity. In the same way that the patronage of learning since the mid-third century B.C. had developed at the courts of princes who rivaled the court of the Qin king, the Western Han princes, residing in their own princedoms far away from the capital, attracted philosophers and literary authors who envisioned models of rulership and cultural accomplishment against which the reality of the imperial court could only pale. It took another exceptional and vigorous ruler, Han Wudi 漢武帝 (r. 141–87 B.C.), to overturn this constellation of rule and opposition by drawing the main scholars and literati to his court, charging the leading princes with plots of revolt, establishing an imperial canon mainly by proscribing competing texts, explicitly those of the “hundred lineages,” and creating an imperial “university” to monopolize learning under imperial control.

While these famous events of 136 and 124 B.C. have traditionally been regarded as decisive steps toward the establishment of “Confucianism” as a state doctrine (the famous “victory of Confucianism”; see below), Lewis' findings allow us to rethink the issue within the context of oppositional or dissident learning that had threatened all previous rulers of Warring States and early imperial times.

The ultimate results of Han Wudi's measures of promotion, control, and censorship of texts were perhaps difficult to foresee at the time: the gradual development of an increasingly powerful, independent, and factionally split imperial bureaucracy of scholars trained in the textual and ritual traditions, including the practical and politically guided arts like divination, calendrics, and omen interpretation, who could speak with authority on issues of rulership. Well-versed in the art of reading the past—in the form of new commentarial traditions that grew alongside the now defined canon—and fully aware of the opposition-stance tradition, this new scholarly class was now part of the imperial structure but far from being under the emperor's control. It was not a particular philosophical

doctrine that came victorious out of the establishment of the canon, but powerful bureaucratic groups with control over an accumulating body of textual knowledge—groups that now continuously challenged the emperor by measuring his rule against the idealized, textually transmitted standards of antiquity. To understand how expertise in the textual tradition was linked to the control of the present, one only needs to read the incessant omen reports with which Han Chengdi 漢成帝 (r. 32–7 B.C.) was confronted, and his stereotypical protestations to commit himself even more to the political advice of his learned courtiers. Pushing Lewis' opposition-stance analysis only one short step further into considerations of the early imperial situation, it appears that it was the formation of the canon, together with its officially sponsored textual and ritual mastery, that moved the opposition stance right into the heart of the gradually developing scholarly bureaucracy.

While Lewis himself refrains from reflections on this decisive turn in the relation of writing and authority in the early empire, his chapter on "Writing the Masters" provides a sociology of learning in Warring States times from which future scholarship will need to start. He describes "four major avenues of gaining a livelihood from literacy" (p. 96): state service, usually on the level of local administration, as evident from recently excavated tombs and their texts; low-level schoolteaching or ritual expertise; technical expertise in disciplines like astrology, hemerology, medicine, divination, or exorcism; and philosophical learning as we know it from the various scholarly traditions. Those engaged in the last-mentioned profession were "in all likelihood smallest in number" (p. 96), yet they are the ones who have almost exclusively shaped the traditional accounts of early Chinese learning. The increasing number of excavated texts will radically challenge this vision (and our textbook accounts), as becomes abundantly clear from Lewis' discussion.

A central issue that is less obvious from this chapter—and that is a promising candidate to remain under debate for years to come—is the significance of writing itself in establishing the authority of the text, the ways in which the written text gradually acquired preeminence over the text of oral teachings, and the chronology of these changes. The authority of a text is not the same as the authority of its being written down; a song that is sung, or a story that is told, is of course a text even if never written down, and it remains an oral text for all of those who always heard but never read it. One might therefore ask: why did none of the early "masters" actually write his own text, if writing would indeed have enhanced the authority of his teachings? And when the "masters" were invented in their texts, did this necessarily imply the notion of writing these texts, or did the oral teaching in fact gradually generate the image of the master, recreating his original mode of instruction? When the texts began to become transmitted through individual teachers, how important was the role of their written version

for matters of instruction, on the one hand, and transmission on the other? Why is the *Mozi* unique, as Lewis notes in chapter 3, in emphasizing the importance of writing? Why did no other text respond to what appears in the *Mozi* as nothing less than “the first theory of the use of writing as a form of authoritative language and a means of maintaining order” or “a theory of writing as a mode of language made powerful through its ability to preserve the teachings of great men across time” (p. 113)? Was it indeed the written version that created and sustained the textual lineage, as one could argue for later times—for example for the Daoist Shangqing 上清 tradition? Granted that these factions would each have created their own books, each endowed with the particular authority of the written word, one also wonders why the texts of different factions could finally end up together (as in the famous example of the *Mozi*) in one written book.

From such considerations, it seems difficult to grant the written text in Warring States times any superior prestige and authority beyond its role in communication with the spirits. From excavated manuscripts it is now clear that by the late fourth century B.C., longer texts of various contents and outside the tradition of the earlier inscriptions were written down—but for what purpose? Why are these texts in tombs—and what was their significance outside the tomb? In other words: since when do we actually talk about “writing and authority” versus “text and authority”?

Chapter 3, “Writing the Past,” sets out with an account of the structure and chronology of the *Shangshu*. Following the general agreement that the five “proclamations” (*gao* 誥) constitute the early core of the work, Lewis supports the idea that these texts are indeed Western Zhou documents, possibly preserved on bamboo strips that were kept for archival purposes. By contrast, the documents that mention the legendary culture heroes of high antiquity appear only in the later layers of the received New Text *Shangshu*; the same late chapters also contain numerical orders that exhibit “the Warring States belief in numbers as a form of control” related to “claims to be comprehensive accounts of the world” (p. 103). From such observations as well as from the citation patterns of the *Documents* in Warring States texts, Lewis proposes that “the history of the composition of the *Shangshu* can thus be summarized as a gradual transition from the realm of the state to that of the schools” (p. 105); the old proclamations are now integrated into new and different political discourses and appropriated by the “masters.” Appealing as this scenario is, it necessarily builds upon certain assumptions that await further confirmation from new archaeological finds. Most important, it is not yet clear what the “Documents” actually were in Warring States times. Lewis argues that “a comparison of the titles cited in the *Zuo zhuan* and those in the Han New Text *Shangshu* indicates that the latter had largely taken shape by the last decades of the fourth century” and that “by the fourth century the *Shangshu* had in fact become the property of the schoolmen” (pp. 106–107).

At the same time, he mentions (without questioning it) Matsumoto Masa-aki's hypothesis of "at least two and probably three distinct *Shangshu*, a *ru* version exemplified by the citations in the *Mencius*, a Mohist version, and a historian's version indicated by the citations in the *Zuo zhuan* and the *Guoyu*." Moreover, he is able to identify very different uses of the individual parts of the *Shangshu* both between "the *ru* and the non-*ru*" (the latter assumedly represented by the *Han Feizi* and the *Lüshi chunqiu* 呂氏春秋, which quote primarily those parts dealing with pre-Zhou mythology) and within the *ru* tradition, where quotation patterns emerge that are quite different from the *Xunzi* 荀子 and the *Liji*. (Here, the question could be raised as to what extent these two typologically very different texts can be compared, and which parts of the *Liji* should be considered as belonging to the same *ru* tradition as the *Xunzi*.) These differences notwithstanding, Lewis also points to important commonalities among different lineages using the *Shangshu*, in particular to the most interesting fact that "citations were drawn largely from documents more recent in date of composition, although often more ancient in their supposed origins." By contrast, "of the seven or eight documents that represent the probable core of the anthology, only the 'Kang gao' is quoted more than once or twice in the Warring States period," and "even when earlier documents like the 'Kang gao' are cited, the passages quoted are linguistically close to the language of the Warring States texts and hence more comprehensible" (p. 107).

I would like to suggest that the complexity of the evidence does not necessarily point to anything like the *Shangshu* as a fixed collection as early as in the late fourth century, and that it remains unclear in what form the early chapters were actually transmitted. If we are to assume that these proclamations originally were individual texts and maintained in the Zhou lineage archives, how did they reach the "masters" of Warring States times, especially if the latter barely quoted from them? I find it difficult to draw a sharp line between two possible scenarios: different scholarly lineages keeping different versions of a *Shangshu* on the one hand, and a broader pool of "documents" from which different lineages would have extracted particular portions for their respective purposes, and from which finally a certain portion was defined as canonical, on the other. Moreover, I feel tempted to relate this final canonization to the Qin imperial court and its learned *ru* scholars, who for the first time—supported by the learned chancellor Li Si and the first emperor—attempted to monopolize the use and scholarship of the "documents" against their rivals outside the court. Apparently, the New Text *Shangshu* as it appeared in early Han times was the Qin imperial version, transmitted by the Qin imperial erudite Fu Sheng 伏勝 (born 260 B.C.), and this particular collection of "documents," compiled and edited to serve the needs of the first imperial court, might very well have been the first and only "version" of what we know as the New Text *Shangshu*.³⁸

This is not, of course, to say that any particular part must have been composed under the Qin (although scholars have proposed this for several chapters, including the “Yaodian” and the “Qinshi” 秦誓);³⁹ quite to the contrary, the Qin classicist impulse, most clearly reflected in the composition of the imperial stele inscriptions, might have required not that new texts be created but that traditional ones be effectively appropriated that only had to be edited and rearranged for the purposes of imperial legitimation and representation.⁴⁰ In this context, we might need to be careful not to give too much weight to the appearance of particular chapter titles of the received *Shangshu* in Warring States texts. It is not safe to assume that these titles were there originally (instead of being inserted by later editors like Liu Xiang), and if they were original, we cannot tell whether they referred to the same portions of texts that appear under their titles later.

The question of how texts came to be collected, compiled, and transmitted has strong sociological implications and touches immediately on the issue of writing and authority. With Lewis’ reconstruction of the intellectual lineage structure we now have a plausible model of Warring States political and philosophical discourses, even if such important cases like the form of the *Shangshu* must await further archaeological finds to be solved.⁴¹ The largest missing link, however, lies in the eighth through the fifth centuries, for which we still lack any rigorous and broad analysis—even if restricted to the bronze inscriptions—that would inform us about the nature, role, interdependence, and transmission of texts. Even if we have good evidence to assume the existence of archives, we still do not know whether these archives indeed preserved the texts in the same form in which they would appear on the bronze inscriptions or in the “proclamations,” that is, as political and religious utterances. The different elements of these texts, such as the date, the statements of merits, the gift list, the dedication, and the prayer of the bronze inscriptions, may have been based only partly on archival records and otherwise added just for the final, sacralized form in which they were announced to the spirits.⁴² One can easily note that intertextuality among bronze inscriptions, but also among *Shijing* hymns, is particularly strong in their heavily formulaic praise and prayer parts; for these, one perhaps did not need any particular lineage archives but could draw upon common practice as well as upon earlier examples.⁴³

Discussing the role of the past in the political philosophy of the “masters,” Lewis again takes up the issue of venerating the past while advocating the necessity of change that already figures prominently in chapter 1, as briefly discussed above. As he points out, quoting antiquity as a standard for the present is not the ideological property of the *ru* tradition but a common claim resonating throughout Eastern Zhou texts. Similarly, Lewis identifies the idea of “changing with the times” not only in “Legalist” texts but also in the *Lunyu* and elsewhere. While developing his argument on the general significance of this notion primarily in the “Legalist” texts *Shang jun shu* 商君書 and *Han Feizi*, Lewis finds these two texts

inconsistent in their continuous praise of antiquity and concurrent advocacy of change and explains the internal contradictions of both texts as a rhetorical necessity:

Since the existence of the schools required an oppositional stance toward the state, all the philosophical traditions were obliged to endorse the ultimate authority of the past, even if interschool debates and intellectual programs forced them to make gestures toward a rejection of antiquity. It is this dilemma, rather than simple multiple authorship, that produces the internal contradictions in the *Shang Jun shu* and *Han Feizi*. (p. 123)

This conclusion is not without problems. It seems questionable to group these two particular texts together, if only because of the well-known fact that the authenticity of the *Shang jun shu* is highly questionable. The often cited opening passage from the *Shang jun shu*, also cited by Lewis, that evokes the “Three Dynasties” and “Five Hegemons,” who ruled through different rituals and laws, strikes me as dubious because it would be the only known pre-Qin passage operating with these genealogical paradigms of rulership in relation to change.⁴⁴

By contrast, this rhetorical figure becomes very common in Qin and Western Han speeches and writings, and I would argue that it represents not so much a “legalist” but an imperial doctrine, emerging from entirely new necessities of political—now dynastic—legitimation. Only the imperial state faced the problem of legitimacy and authority from a genealogical perspective: ruling over all of China instead of only a limited territory among other states, an imperial dynasty necessarily had to think of itself as the preliminary endpoint of a linear genealogy. Moreover, it is with this genealogical model that the invocation of the past gains its ultimate force and authority, and nowhere more so than in Sima Qian’s 司馬遷 (145–ca. 85 B.C.) *Shiji* 史記, which designs in both cosmological and historical terms a genealogical foundation for the Han dynasty that is ultimately traced back to the reign of the Yellow Emperor. It is with the empire in general, and with the Han in particular, that a dynasty ruled not as an extension of its own genealogical pedigree, and in parallel to other states that had their own genealogies in turn, but as a new beginning that needed to be explained in relation to the one, and only one, preceding reign—and this relation was necessarily to be defined in terms of fundamental change. The *Shiji*, one can therefore argue, owes both its necessity and its linear structure to the idea of dynastic change, and it is not by accident that this is the Western Han text that most intensely develops this idea in genealogical terms.⁴⁵ While we are indebted to Lewis for raising the issue of change in Warring States political philosophy to an entirely new level of discussion, I would like to suggest that it attains its fullest meaning in terms of “writing and authority” in Qin and Western Han times.

As mentioned above in the discussion of chapter 1, the late Warring States and, thereafter, the imperial discourse on the necessity of change is not conducted

on the plane of political doctrines or concrete governmental measures but is primarily directed to matters of ritual and especially ritual music, that is, the representation of rulership (implying that this representation itself was regarded as imbued with formidable civilizational power). Lewis' discussion of the *Zuo zhuan* fully corroborates the importance of this issue: "there is scarcely a story in the work that can be read without knowledge of the rituals that inform the actions of the participants and the readings intended by the authors" (p. 133). Two important recent dissertations, by David Schaberg and Yuri Pines, have not only added substantial evidence to the significance of ritual in the history that is told in the *Zuo zhuan* but also have pointed to possible ritual origins of the text itself, identifying parts of the text as earlier layers that faithfully represent speeches and songs.⁴⁶ While, on certain points, Schaberg and Pines reach almost diametrically contrary conclusions, they both direct us back to the crucial problem of the nature of the *Zuo zhuan* and its sources. The very core of its authority seems to reside in its ample use of purportedly authentic utterances from the historical situations proper, carefully interwoven into a narrative texture.

One may want to accept the authenticity of such utterances as received by the *Zuo* author(s) in either oral (Schaberg's thesis) or written (Pines' thesis) form, or one may wonder how many of them were retrospectively invented; in both scenarios, they serve as the seal of authenticity for the narrative, and as the proof of truth for its moral authority. This authority of the *Zuo zhuan*, although mediated through its written account, rests primarily in the perceived truth of its ritualized speeches and songs (both canonical and non-canonical), and it is here where the historical narrative needs to be linked to the early theory of music and poetry, which can be traced to the same period in which the *Zuo zhuan* was presumably compiled, namely the late fourth century B.C. In the same way that the songs of the *Shijing* were understood as "history told in verse,"⁴⁷ the historical narrative of the *Zuo zhuan* needs to be related to the theory of music and poetry (fully developed first for music in the "Yueji" and then transformed into a theory of literature in the "Great Preface") as authentic, unmediated, and "natural" responses to the circumstances of the times. Through its own structure of embedded ritualized orality, the *Zuo zhuan* as a text derives its authority from what it is most concerned with, namely the ritual order. The true authors of the *Zuo zhuan* are the nobles and commoners who speak in their own voices: remonstrating, singing, prophesying.

With these complementary notes to chapter 3, "Writing the Past," I have already moved to the following chapter, "Writing the Self," which is dedicated to early poetry. Stating that "another type of authoritative text that developed in the Warring States period was verse," Lewis divides Warring States verse writings into three categories:

First, a limited body of songs from the Zhou period was preserved, and perhaps supplemented through later imitations. These were ultimately collected in the canonical *Shi jing*. Second, verse was incorporated into the texts of philosophical traditions to make their writing more memorable and persuasive. . . . Third, verse forms derived from songs employed in shamanic rituals were employed to compose literary poetry as a form of protest or persuasion. These, along with derivative Han pieces, were collected in the *Chu ci*. (p. 147)

This account, which seems to place the formation of the canonical *Shijing* rather late in Warring States times, needs at least one important addition: as scholars like Edward Shaughnessy (or, earlier, Dobson) have insisted, the early parts of the *Shijing* can be linguistically related to Western and early Eastern Zhou bronze inscriptions. In early China, inscriptions bearing such poetic structures as rhyme, meter, reduplicatives, and onomatopoeic expressions outnumber all known non-inscribed songs. The continuity between both text forms is more than just a footnote to the early development of Chinese poetry; it locates the origins of verse in the realm of religious rituals and historical commemoration that considerably prefigures Warring States ideas about the nature and function of poetic texts.

Again, Lewis' work, although focused on the Warring States period, cannot but indirectly hint at the crucial deficit our field is suffering from: lacking any attempt at a rigorous literary (as opposed to merely philological and linguistic) analysis of the bronze texts, we necessarily remain severely handicapped in grasping important generic aspects of the *Shijing*. Without going into the details here, two aspects—self-referentiality and commemoration—should be mentioned. Lewis traces the emergence of the literary author to a certain group of *Shijing* songs that conclude by referring to their own composition, naming the author and/or the purpose of the composition, as in the following example of “Zheng Min” 烝民 (*Mao* 260): “I, Jifu, have made this recitation, / may it be as gentle as the clear wind! / Zhong Shanfu bears enduring sorrows, / may he take it to soothe his mind!”⁴⁸ Lewis explains this practice in relation to the fact that poetry was seen “as an efficacious form of speech suited to assertions of personal virtue. This use of verse to assert character and to make authoritative moral pronouncements became central to Warring States poetic practice” (p. 154). This cogent analysis can be supported with a glance at the bronze inscriptions and their self-referential statements of dedication and purpose, as mentioned above. To identify oneself as the donor of a bronze (dedicated to the ancestors) or as the composer of a song (dedicated to the living superiors) in order to influence the powers above follows the same logic; compare the following dedication that is part of a longer inscription cast into a set of Qin gong 秦公 bells from the early seventh century B.C.: “I have made my harmonizing bells, / with their numinous sound *tong-tong*, / to delight the august duke(s), / to receive great blessings, accumulated happiness, multiple favors!”

As late as probably 313–312 B.C., the King of Qin, accusing the King of Chu of having violated their earlier oath, addressed the spirits with a stone inscription that was then buried in three copies—the famous “Imprecations against Chu” (“Zu Chu wen” 詛楚文). The text closes with the following formula: “We dare to accuse the King of Chu, Xiongyang, of having turned his back on the [former] oath and having committed a violation [which is punishable with] imprecation. We make [the foregoing report] manifest on various stone memorials in order to swear it towards the awe-inspiring divinity of the great spirit!”⁴⁹ Belonging to very different genres of formalized utterances, being separated by almost four hundred years, and addressing different types of spiritual powers, the two inscriptions are remarkably similar in their final, self-referential turn—and this turn, precisely, is the way in which *Shijing* songs like “Zheng Min” are closed. The authority of the individual voice, as it asserts its moral superiority in songs, seems directly inspired from those inscribed religious utterances that address their statements of virtue to ancestral and cosmic spirits. As a performative speech act, the self-referential claim at the end of a *Shijing* song reaffirms not only the authority of its author but of the song itself.

Lewis’ discussion of “Composing the Odes” is necessarily tentative. We are not well informed about the processes of their original composition and need a good number of additional studies to reach solid ground. One may wish to express some reservations, for example, about the following statement on a historical development from the “Song” 頌 to the “Ya” 雅 sections: “First-person references have vanished, although some passages still address the ancestors in the second person. This distinction could be explained as a chronological development or as a division in function, in which the ‘Song’ section recorded liturgies employed in rites, while the ‘Ya’ recorded events in the name of collective memory” (p. 151). First of all, neither the “Song” nor the “Ya” are anywhere close to being a homogeneous body, as realized already by Kong Yingda 孔穎達 (574–648) for the “Song.”⁵⁰ Second, the four perhaps most elaborate liturgical hymns are nos. 209–212, which are in the “Xiao Ya” 小雅 section and which make ample use not only of first- and second-person pronouns but also of direct designations of the ritual participants (including the spirits). A close linguistic analysis of *Mao* 209 (“*Chucl*” 楚茨) has led me to the conclusion that this hymn is indeed a multivocal song that was both performative and commemorative when used in the ancestral sacrifices.⁵¹ In more general terms, I would doubt that one can indeed distinguish between these two functions, or arrange them in a chronological order, since the ancestral sacrifices themselves were the ultimate arena of commemoration (as the bronze inscriptions make abundantly clear); performance and commemoration are in fact interdependent.

The brief and somewhat speculative account on “Composing the Odes” is in fact only the introduction to “Speaking Through the Odes” and “The Odes as

Proof and Sanction”—and these sections are, simply put, the most brilliant discussion to date of the use of *Shijing* songs in Eastern Zhou times. Tracing the use of the *Odes* through the *Lunyu*, *Mengzi*, *Zuo zhuan*, and *Xunzi*, Lewis proves over and over again how Warring States texts imply “the importance placed on the role of poetry as evidence of historical realities” (p. 165) and thus anticipate both the Western Han commentaries as well as the theory of poetry presented in the “Great Preface.” As noted above, the late Eastern Zhou philosophers and historians marshaled song after song to “turn archaic verse into contemporary argument” (p. 169). Not only were the “mutated” (*bian* 變) songs of Eastern Zhou times regarded as virtually the works of historians, but their value as proof of historical truth was doubled by being again applicable to the new and ever-changing circumstances. All the anonymous or named composers of songs were model historians, “for it is their emotional response to moral and political decay that drives them to write” (p. 176), and their claims to immediacy and authenticity would then be appropriated by the later writers who filled their philosophical arguments and historical narratives with poetic quotations. And while the songs proved the historical truth and depth of such arguments and narratives, the polyvalent poetic utterances in turn depended on their new narrative contexts in order to become unambiguous and hence to speak a specific truth, as Lewis notes with respect to the use of “presenting the odes” (*fu shi* 賦詩) in the *Zuo zhuan*: “The problematic aspects of the presentation of odes—that the verses were left morally ungrounded and hermeneutically open—were eliminated through the insertion of quotations into arguments that indicated how the verses were to be read” (p. 168). The philosopher and the historian, in other words, were genuine and competent interpreters of poetic songs. Lewis’ analysis culminates in relating the composition and quotation of the songs to the opposition stance of the “masters”:

Just as the master was created in the text that derived from his teaching, so the ruler and the state were invented within the texts which drew their meaning from the political order. Inscribing the eclipse of royal virtue and the fact of dynastic collapse, the anthology of the odes became a seat of royalty that survived the transition from one house to the next, and that preserved the memory of ritual order when the reality had been lost. Based on the hidden monarchy of the odes anthology, the voice of the individual historian who composed or scholar who quoted could speak with the ruler’s authority in times of decay. This is another form of the schoolmen’s claim to virtual kingship. (p. 176)

Lewis extends his conclusions on the historical interpretation of songs skillfully to the discussion of the *Chuci* 楚辭 image of Qu Yuan 屈原. Like the “masters” of the philosophical texts, Qu Yuan becomes effectively invented through the texts attributed to him, and, in turn, the texts, and here especially the “*Li sao*,” become intelligible only through the assumed biography of their putative author:

The linking of the text to Qu Yuan also inserted the poem into a narrative structure and thereby performed the same function as assigning the Zhou odes to the reigns of different monarchs. . . . Anyone who has struggled with this difficult text knows the sense of relief that can be experienced by collapsing it onto the tale of Qu Yuan. (p. 189)

New with Qu Yuan, I would like to suggest, was the Han invention of the individual author with his biography, raising the issue of personal authenticity and immediacy to a new level and defining the extreme case of an opposition-stance voice. As Qu Yuan's biography is a Han construction in order to make sense of a body of otherwise highly enigmatic verse, Han reactions to this biography reflect yet another aspect of the interplay of writing and authority, now under the new conditions of the unified empire: Jia Yi 賈誼 (200–168 B.C.) and Yang Xiong 揚雄 (53 B.C.–A.D. 18), both serving as scholars in official positions, condemn Qu Yuan for his suicide and argue that he should have searched or waited for a different ruler to serve—an option that, ironically, was no longer available to these critics in the new era of a unified empire.

Chapter 5, “The Political History of Writing,” analyzes the mythologies of Fu Xi 伏羲, Confucius, and the Duke of Zhou as the three putative authors of the *Yijing* 易經, who “embody the history of the relations between textual mastery and kingship” (p. 195). The reconstruction of the Fu Xi myth rests on an entirely different body of texts, compared to those considered in the previous chapters. The two key texts are the “Appended Phrases” (“Xici” 繫辭), a.k.a. the “Great Tradition” (“Da zhuan” 大傳), that is, the famous (probably late Warring States) cosmological text related to the *Yijing*, and the postface of Xu Shen's 許慎 (ca. 55–ca. 149) *Shuowen jiezi* 說文解字. In addition, Lewis draws on a variety of apocryphal—possibly Han period—cosmological and numerological writings (*weishu* 緯書) as well as on several post-Han texts to unfold a full picture of Fu Xi as “the inventor of the trigrams, and by extension the creator of writing and of kingship” (p. 208). Fascinating as this account undoubtedly is, one may wonder about its actual significance for Warring States and even Western Han times, that is, for the focus of Lewis' study. It remains an open question why the “Xici,” attested as an early and possibly well-known text by its inclusion among the Mawangdui tomb texts, appears to have been completely ignored in the mainstream philosophical discourse of Warring States and Western Han times—while its theory of the emergence of the script was nevertheless transmitted since it reappears with Xu Shen some three hundred or more years after its original composition.

How is it possible that a text of such significance, relating the origins of Chinese civilization and writing to a fully developed cosmology together with a practice of divination, was not discussed by the major minds of its time? Or, if we wish to argue that this text, and its particular theory of the origins of the script, was indeed important: to what extent should we reconsider the very particular

body of texts to which it seems related—the apocrypha—in order to think about “writing and authority”? Of course, such a question points beyond the scope of Lewis’ study, but without at least a tentative answer, one wonders how this multifaceted picture of Fu Xi was actually related to all the other forms through which the authority of the written text arose—and how strikingly separate the various textual worlds of early China must have been.

In sharp contrast to the Fu Xi materials, the mythology of the Duke of Zhou appears entirely in the traditional canon, the writings of the “masters,” and historiographical works like the *Zuo zhuan*. As Lewis explains through a succinct analysis of the “Jin teng” 金滕 chapter of the *Shangshu*, the Duke, even more than King Wen 文, is presented as someone who manifests his virtue through the practice and power of writing. From a number of subsequent texts, the Duke gradually emerges as “the embodiment of civilization”: “In his role as putative author of the literary heritage of the Zhou, the Duke of Zhou came to stand not only for the political institutions but also for the Zhou civilization as a whole”; he was not only “the putative creator of the Zhou institutions” but also, and perhaps more importantly, “the author of texts that preserved the memory of these institutions after they had fallen into decay” (p. 217). Lewis concludes that the various passages in which these visions are developed “mark a major development in ideas about writing. In a world where the Zhou monarchy had all but disappeared, it survived in the form of a body of texts: the *Changes*, the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, the *Ritual*, and the statutes of Lu. To this list we can add the *Odes*, for in the story of Ji Zha’s visit to Lu . . . the entire history of the Zhou is revealed in the musical performance of the odes” (p. 217). For the narratives of both Fu Xi and the Duke of Zhou, I would like to register that the emphasis on writing is not the whole story. While the example of the *Odes* is somewhat exceptional here since the respective passage in the *Zuo zhuan* is concerned exclusively with musical performance and not with texts, the unifying element of the whole series of texts, including the *Odes*, is their genuinely ritual basis. Moreover, according to the “Jin teng,” the Duke’s use of the written text is entirely within the framework of early ritual practice, specifically the communication with spirits. Employing and creating texts, Fu Xi appears as a master of the cosmos, while the Duke of Zhou is a master of ritual. In both cases, the meaning and efficacy of the texts is unthinkable without their religious contexts.

The role of the “master of textual authority” (p. 218) was only ascribed to Confucius, and not before very late Warring States times. In a careful analysis of the Confucius narrative in the *Shiji* and its various sources and parallel texts, Lewis demonstrates how Confucius was depicted both as a harsh and highly efficient legal administrator, or “committed defender of centralized absolutism” (p. 225), and as someone whose authorship of the *Chunqiu* 春秋 must be read in line with the ideas about the composition of poetry, as they were applied to the un-

derstanding of both the *Odes* and the *Chuci*. Lewis' Confucius writes the *Chunqiu* as "a substitute for the political path that had been blocked to him" and "as a cry of despair cast into the void in the hope that someone might read it and grasp the author's intentions" (pp. 235–236). Textual authority, again, is conferred to the one who responds to the circumstances of moral and political decay in an authentic and immediate voice—a voice that becomes fully developed in his biography of the *Shiji*, the great historical work sealed with the very same personal sentiment. (Sima Qian's Confucius seems dangerously similar to Sima Qian.)

While all three studies on Fu Xi, the Duke of Zhou, and Confucius are extraordinarily instructive and innovative, I find it not easy to follow Lewis' synthesis of their mythologies as a sequence that "traced out a history of the relation between texts and political authority" (p. 238). Despite the fact that all three figures were regarded as authors of different layers of the *Yijing*, these accounts are too different, their respective sources too sharply demarcated, and their meanings too little interrelated for me to dare to subsume them under a single system of thought, spanning the period from the early *Shangshu* across the Zhou and both the Western and Eastern Han eras. Not only are the three mythologies developed in three quite distinctive sets of texts; they also relate to largely different contexts: cosmology in the case of Fu Xi, ritual communication in the case of the Duke of Zhou, and the discourse on authentic authorship out of distress in the case of Confucius. In "The Political History of Writing," the author's attempt at one overall system might appear a bit stretched. Not that it would be wrong or misleading—but one can easily imagine how to construct a different system or how to tell a set of very different stories by disconnecting the three cases from each other and instead relating Confucius' authorship of the *Chunqiu* to his purported compilation of the *Odes*, the Duke of Zhou's image in the "Jin teng" to a discussion of writing as ritual communication with the spirits, and Fu Xi's mastery of the cosmos to the following chapter, "The Natural Philosophy of Writing," a study that focuses primarily on the use of the *Yijing* in early imperial times.

A large part of this chapter is devoted to the "Appended Phrases," which is the primary document where the transformation of the *Yijing* from a divination handbook to a cosmological treatise becomes manifest. As Lewis makes clear, this shift in emphasis from divination to philosophy has developed gradually through Eastern Zhou texts and resulted in the elevation of the *Changes* to a canonical book alongside—and ultimately even above—the *Odes* and the *Documents*. An important element in this transition is brought out by an analysis of several *Guoyu* 國語 and *Zuo zhuan* passages, from which Lewis draws the following conclusion: "Duke Xiang will cite divinations in his argument only as an adjunct of his observations and with the imprimatur of a classic text. Divination here supplements the ritual-based percipience and textual learning of the scholar. One reads the will of the spirits as one reads the intent of a man in his verse, or his vir-

tue in his ritual conduct" (p. 245). Carrying Lewis' account a bit further, I would suggest that if there is any text in early China that clearly exhibits the continuous shift from a ritual-centered culture to a text-oriented one, it is the *Yijing* with its commentaries, and this shift was only accomplished in Han times, when divination finally came to be supplanted by omen interpretation—the specialization not of religious but of textual specialists like Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (ca. 195–ca. 115 B.C.) or Liu Xiang 劉向 (79–8 B.C.), who drew on the records of the past, in particular the *Chunqiu*, to foretell the future significance of contemporary events. This relation appears indeed explicitly in the early *Yijing* commentaries (p. 259).

In his analysis of the "Xici," Lewis unfolds the "natural philosophy of signs" (p. 252), according to which writing was dissociated from speech and given pre-eminence as endowed with the capacity, as a graphic system "rooted in the patterns of the cosmos" (p. 255), to relate directly to the world. In this ideological construct, writing is not the extension of the spoken word but its superior and more trustworthy replacement. The "conflation of sign and reality is central to the project of elaborating a natural philosophy of writing, a project in which the *Yi* was the central text" (p. 262). Here, however, one may want to be more precise: it is not the original *Changes* that makes this claim but the much later layers of cosmological texts like the "Appended Phrases." The antagonism between the spoken and the written word is not a feature of the core of the *Yijing*, where the line statements in fact include rhymed passages and poetic images that are clearly related to canonical and non-canonical songs of their time.⁵² The process during which the sign became identified with the world, finally leading into a whole new theory of representation, is a historical one: as pointed out by Edward Shaughnessy and quoted by Lewis, it was only in the late Warring States when a text like the "Xici" tried "to prove the imagistic basis of no less than thirteen hexagrams" (p. 270). The new ideology of the written "image" and graph—which has brought the world the notorious misconception of the Chinese script as an ideographic system—was accompanied by an explicit denunciation of the spoken word. As Lewis notes, skepticism about the truth of the spoken word can be found not only in the *Laozi* and the *Zhuangzi* but reflects a more general issue of late Warring States times—which is the era when the political discourse was characterized by the rhetorically skilled speeches and debates of the "wandering persuaders" (*you shui* 游說), and when the major philosophical texts were presented as collections of dialogues and face-to-face exchanges of arguments.

Juxtaposed with Warring States realities, the ideas of numerology and graphic representation as derived from the *Changes* appear as an attempt to construct universal truth claims high above the vocal multiplicity of Warring States political and philosophical discourses. Such truth claims also inform the compilation of Xu Shen's character dictionary *Shuowen jiezi*, which was nothing less than an attempt to "render the interpretation of the classics doubt-free, thereby put-

ting the full force of their cumulative and sanctified wisdom at the service of the Han government in its very immediate objective of enforcing order in all areas of human activity through a dominant central authority.”⁵³ Moving from the “Xici” to the *Shuowen*, and from there to Han numerology, Lewis outlines succinctly this supreme early Chinese attempt at a systematic account of the cosmos. Clearly, the “Xici” matches other such all-encompassing textual endeavors of its time, especially that of the *Zhouli*, which again rests on cosmological numerology (see pp. 47–48), as mentioned above. Numerical order is not only embodied in the hexagrams and discovered in the world; with works like the *Zhouli* or the *Lüshi chunqiu*, it becomes directly inscribed into the very texts that describe this system—fully corroborating the basic thesis of *Writing and Authority in Early China*, namely that the texts were created as “parallel realities . . . claimed to depict the entire world” (p. 4).

The culmination of early imperial numerology may be found in the very first of the *Hanshu* 漢書 monographs (chapter 21), namely the “Monograph on pitch pipes and calendar” (“Lüli zhi” 律曆志), that hence may be understood as the basis of all the following ones. Involving the *Yijing* as the source of numbers, this text derives the complete cosmic order as embodied in weights and measures from the size of the “Yellow Bell”⁵⁴ (*huangzhong* 黃鐘). On this, one might have hoped for more than a few remarks (pp. 283–284). While the relation of music, mathematics, and calendrical astronomy is a truly universal phenomenon, we should register that its systematic account seems to have developed only from very late Warring States times onward, that is, parallel to all the other attempts at a “world formula.” The above-mentioned bells from the tomb of Zeng Hou Yi of 433 B.C. do not make explicit such an understanding of music, even if their inscribed system of tones and pitches may well represent a stage of theorizing that is intellectually antecedent to later correlative thinking.

By contrast, the “Lüli zhi” contributes to the imperial idea of a fusion of history and the cosmos: while Han sources, as noted above, develop a perfect sequence of ideal ancient music to duplicate the genealogy of ideal rulership historically, the account on pitch pipes and the calendar develops the model of supreme rulership on the cosmological plane. As each of the former culture heroes created his own music, so the empire, through Han Wudi’s calendar reform of 105–104 B.C., designed its own musical-calendaric order as the order of the cosmos. And as the genealogy of music starts with the Yellow Emperor, so the origin of music and the world lies in the pitch of the Yellow Bell⁵⁵—which, as part of the twelve pitches correlating to the twelve months, had been “discovered” in nature by the Yellow Emperor himself. In other words, control of the Yellow Bell pitch—to be redefined at the beginning of a dynasty—meant nothing less than control over cosmic order as well as the expression of a dynasty’s position within the historical succession of rules. What had been the most exalted form of Zhou

ritual culture was now transformed into *written texts* that define the empire in terms both historical and cosmological, with the authority of the former being transferred to the latter. The text to preserve this control was the book of the historian.

I would therefore suggest that the *Hanshu* deserves a prominent position among those texts considered in chapter 7, "The Encyclopedic Epoch," which finally fulfilled the "dream of writing the world in a single text" (p. 287). Here, Lewis starts with a series of brief summaries: on the Eastern Zhou philosophical discourse on universal claims, on the textual categories of canon (*jing* 經) and commentary (*zhuan* 傳), and on "state-sponsored" compendia under which he subsumes both the *Lüshi chunqiu* and the *Huainanzi* 淮南子. With respect to the *jing/zhuan* relation, he points out that only the commentary makes the canon: "The fact that existing works were *transformed* into 'canon/classic' indicates a crucial point about the emergence of *jing* as a textual category. Virtually any text could in theory have been established as a *jing* through the addition of a *zhuan*. . . . The addition of a commentary certified a text as a constant, fundamental norm by showing its hidden depths or polyvalent application to many situations" (p. 301). While this is certainly true, it is not just the commentary by itself that defines the canon; it always takes certain members of the scholarly and political elite as a particular class within the imperial bureaucracy that develops together with the canon and its scholarship, beginning with the Qin and early Han erudites (*boshi* 博士).

Discussing the development of the canon through its series of commentaries, we must therefore direct our attention to the fact that it directly reflects the sociology of the early imperial courts, in particular the power balance between the emperor and his learned officials. One cannot explain the development of either the imperial bureaucracy or the canon without relating the one to the other; and ultimately, these considerations shed light even on the development of the role of the emperor, which again is only comprehensible in its changing relation to the imperial bureaucracy of canon-trained men. To clarify the issue of writing and authority under the conditions of the empire, the question to ask is simple, though the answer may require another monograph: who are the men who decide on the canon, and to what extent is the respective emperor able to control them? Moreover, I believe that a discussion of "canonship" would need to be informed from a cross-cultural perspective; books like John Henderson's study on Confucian and Western exegesis, the volume on scripture edited by Miriam Levering, or the studies by Jan and Aleida Assmann are certainly to be included here, to name at least a few of the most important works.⁵⁶

Such a perspective would also bear directly on texts like the *Lüshi chunqiu* and *Huainanzi* and their claim for a totality of cosmologically organized knowledge—a claim that seems to rival that of the canon. The all-encompassing scope

of such works, absorbing the various competing doctrines into comprehensive compendia that “were in all likelihood written to guide the conduct of a young ruler” (p. 303) may not at all have peacefully coexisted with the imperial canon; and the—in Lewis’ view unfounded—accusations that their sponsors, Chief Minister Lü Buwei 呂不韋 (d. 235 B.C.) and Prince Liu An 劉安 (175–122 B.C.), were plotting against their rulers might be related to this issue. That the two works did not attain canonical status is not because “they differed from *jing* in avoiding a hierarchical division into a central text and appended explications” (p. 308) but because they were not institutionalized at the level of state-learning, that is, endowed with official chairs and their commentarial traditions.

In the same sense, Sima Qian’s monumental and equally encyclopedic *Shiji*—the supreme model of an opposition-stance historiography under imperial conditions—did not become a canon, despite its claim to continue the *Chunqiu* ascribed to Confucius, and despite the structure that Lewis assigns to it when claiming (p. 311) that the biographies/memoirs (*zhuan* 傳) are to the chronicles (*ji* 紀) what the commentaries/traditions (*zhuan* 傳) are to the canons (*jing* 經). Both equations—“commentary/tradition” with “biography/memoir” and “chronicle” with “canon,” the latter on very tenuous phonological and semantical grounds—seem forced to me, and I find it difficult to see how they actually explain the nature and motivation of the *Shiji*. When Lewis extends the analogies even further, the actual evidence does not really fit his attempt to integrate the *Shiji* into the system of the canon: “The monographs on ritual and imperial sacrifices thus correspond to the canonical texts on ritual, those on music and the pitchpipes to music, and those on the calendar and astrology to divination. While the monographs on waterways and merchants have no exact canonical analogue, they are closely related to the ‘Yu gong’ chapter of the Documents” (p. 312). I quote this passage, being only part of his overall vision of the *Shiji* as a universal and quasi-canonical text, to illustrate that at some crucial points Lewis pays considerable tribute to his overall attempt to reconstruct the practice of writing in early China as one coherent system. The immediately following four paragraphs begin with these phrases:

Sima Qian’s work also aims to be comprehensive as an anthology of earlier texts. . . . The multivoiced nature of the work, which marks it as universal, is also employed in several ways to create authoritative speech. . . . The encyclopedic nature of Sima Qian’s work may also be marked by having the numbers of chapters correspond to the calendar in the manner of the *Lüshi chunqiu*. . . . Sima Qian also asserts the comprehensive nature of his history in the genealogy of his family at the beginning of the postface. (pp. 312–313)

While none of these claims is entirely wrong, and several are in fact significant, each of them seems to require some qualification. But what makes the whole sequence problematic is its rhetorical structure: everything “also” contributes to an

overarching idea that by itself is an imaginative and fascinating construct—but maybe *only* a construct. Highly diverse aspects of the *Shiji* all seem to march in the same direction, elevated to contribute “also” to a common order, but in fact reduced to just this function. While glistening with brilliant ideas, the section does not do justice to the complexity of Sima Qian’s text—for example when arguing that it is indeed a text marked by a stance of opposition against Han Wudi. Considering the issues of writing and authority, an in-depth discussion of particularly this issue (which receives little more than a page of attention) might have been meaningful. One may, for example, raise the following question: if both the *Lüshi chunqiu* and *Huainanzi* were encyclopedic texts to guide a ruler, how should they be compared to the *Shiji* as another encyclopedic text that sharply criticizes the ruler (and even the very same ruler as in the case of the *Huainanzi*)? Were texts of this nature open to any kind of use? While Lewis argues that with respect to the former two works it is important to realize that “a chief minister or a king assembled scholars from the competing traditions and produced a collective work synthesizing their positions into a harmonious whole” (p. 303), the exact opposite would be true for the enterprise of the *Shiji*. Such contradictions do not devalue the thesis of the encyclopedic texts, but they raise numerous issues one would need to pursue in order to grasp the full complexity of the phenomenon.

The following section, “Sima Xiangru and Universal Poetry,” aims at another aspect of the totality of the written realm. Here, Lewis’ account of Sima Xiangru’s *fu* as texts that “invoke the power and glory of the Han through versions of the theme of universality” (p. 321) is entirely in line with the relevant scholarship; to be all-encompassing and exhaustive is on every plane the defining feature of the *fu* genre. A problem arises when Lewis relates the *fu* explicitly to the practice of writing: “The use of rare characters and their clustering in groups sharing a signific calls attention to the role of the *written* character in re-creating the world, and anticipates the theory of characters in the *Shuo wen jie zi*” (p. 317). I find it difficult to agree with this idea for the following reason: although put into writing and “read” (*du* 讀, meaning “to read aloud” or “to recite”), we know from the sources that the *fu* was a genre primarily not to be read but to be recited by a special group of court entertainers who were skilled in the demanding presentation of regional idioms. As Kamatani Takeshi has compellingly argued, the *fu* were perceived primarily on the level of sound, that is, as texts in performance,⁵⁷ and David Knechtges’ meticulous annotations to the rhyming and alliterative binomes of these extremely difficult pieces provide a wealth of evidence for this almost material quality of the language, which overwhelmed and silenced its listeners by means of its sensual acoustical splendor⁵⁸—a phenomenon that derives, at least in part, directly from the oral rhetoric of the Warring States “wandering persuaders,” which is acknowledged as one of the primary sources of the *fu* as a genre.⁵⁹

Yet what speaks most clearly against the assumption that the *fu* was primarily conceived of as a written text is the evidence that comes from the three different versions of Sima Xiangru's *fu* itself, namely in the *Shiji*, the *Hanshu*, and the *Wenxuan* 文選. As we know, for example, from excavated Han manuscripts, the script was not yet fixed in the second century B.C., and certainly not in the distribution of semantic classifiers (or "significs," in Lewis' terminology). A closer comparison between the different versions of Sima Xiangru's *fu* leads to the following result: the clustering of semantic classifiers—which is essentially a phenomenon of the rhyming and alliterative binomes—is much denser in the *Shiji* version than in that of the *Hanshu*. Interestingly, the *Wenxuan* by and large follows the *Hanshu*, not the *Shiji*, and probably rightly so: as Yves Hervouet has demonstrated, the *Shiji* version of Sima Xiangru's works is clearly inferior and very likely a later—possibly on the basis of the *Hanshu*—rewritten version.⁶⁰ This means that it is problematic to relate the feature of clustered semantic classifiers in the written graphs to "Sima Xiangru's work as a lexicographer"⁶¹ (p. 322). More likely, it is something added to the text after the compilation of the *Hanshu* in the first century A.D.—and as such reflects not the reality of the Western Han *fu* but a focus on writing that postdates those Eastern Han developments in which the *Shuowen jiezi* plays its role in fixing the script.

On this evidence, I would suggest that the *fu* is primarily a genre testifying to the lingering status of the oral performance text. This is what the *Hanshu* says about the genre: "To recite without singing is *fu*."⁶² In fact, no early definition of the *fu* emphasizes the aspect of its written form, while several refer to its oral nature.⁶³ In this respect, the *fu* rhapsodies are decidedly different from a work like the *Shiji*—to some extent, they even question the primacy of the written word as late as in the second century B.C. and instead point to the same mutual enhancement of speech and writing that I have tried to identify in Zhou bronze inscriptions (and, as noted above, inscriptions were still recited at the very end of the Western Han). In both cases, the linguistic structure is dominated by those features that contribute to the text's aural efficacy.

The development of the *fu* as a genre of the *written* text can in fact be traced through the history of its later examples, especially the works of the great *fu* writers Yang Xiong, Ban Gu 班固 (32–92), and Zhang Heng 張衡 (78–139), where the issue of graphical variants was by and large resolved. Moreover, in terms of writing and authority there are other important differences between Western and Eastern Han *fu* writers: at the Wudi court, authors like Sima Xiangru never gained a position of any rank, and they were not respected as political advisors but treated as court entertainers. Yang Xiong, by contrast, was an imperial librarian and, although not occupying a high political position, he was a distinctive political voice in his times. Ban Gu, the great Eastern Han historian, ranked among the most illustrious advisors and distinguished officials; Zhang Heng occupied

various positions at the imperial court because of his scientific expertise and literary skills. Against this background, it is interesting to note that none of Sima Xiangru's great epideictic *fu* were commissioned by the emperor; they were all presented by the author. By contrast, Yang Xiong's much more critical pieces were written on imperial command. Compared to the earlier model of Sima Xiangru and others, writers like Yang, Ban, and Zheng were therefore court poets in a different sense: while writing in a more institutionalized frame, they also appear to have enjoyed a higher status as political advisors and critics. The discussion of writing and authority in relation to the most important of all literary genres in Han China—the *fu*—cannot be detached from these basic facts.

The imperial library of late Western Han times and its catalog—the topic of Lewis' next section—is indeed the triumph of the idea of the written text, and it is the triumph of the scholarly bureaucracy. According to Lewis, the Liu Xiang / Liu Xin catalog “was composed when the *ru* tradition had come to dominate the intellectual field. Consequently it builds its textual universe around the assumption that the officially canonized *ru* texts were both the exemplary models of proper writing and the origin of all other categories of the text” (p. 325). Moreover, the catalog was compiled “in the immediate aftermath of the triumph of Confucianism” (p. 326). Following these introductory remarks, Lewis undertakes an excellent analysis of the catalog and its function as a carefully organized universe of text, demonstrating how it perfectly matched the needs of the empire, and how it duplicated the empire in a vision of textual order: “Mapping texts onto government reflects not only the equation of intellectual with political authority but also the model of multiplicity emerging from, and being resolved back into, a primal unity” (p. 331). In this new order, the “masters” were “now placed in a subordinate position within a larger order defined by the canon” (p. 332).

From these observations, it is obvious that the imperial library—and the reality of institutionalized imperial learning reflected in it—had far-reaching consequences for the relation between writing and authority. The Warring States “masters” who actually had gradually defined the canon through their selective quotations in the first place were now placed below not only the canon but also canonical scholarship. With the well-known court debates among the competing commentarial schools, represented by different members of the imperial bureaucracy, the opposition-stance voices disappeared in their original form, giving room to a new arena of institutionalized discussion and advice to the emperor. The canon and its scholarship also no longer was in competition with the inherited system of ritual practice. Through the proposals of influential statesmen like Kuang Heng 匡衡 (chancellor 36–30 B.C.), the canon and its exegesis, with either explicit or implicit information about the supposed ancient forms of ritual, now became the standard to which current practice was submitted and according to which it was “corrected.”⁶⁴ As indicated above, I have some reservations about

identifying these developments as “the triumph of Confucianism” as long as we do not clarify what is to be understood as Han “Confucianism”—a specific philosophical doctrine, a frame of learning defined according to a specific body of texts, or, in a broader sense, the officially institutionalized teaching and training at the imperial court. It is probably true that “in the rhetoric of the Han Confucians the Warring States period became an age of assassinated princes and murdered fathers, a topos for the abolition of hierarchy and the collapse of social order” (p. 354), but this is equally true for the Qin imperial view, and crucial for the legitimation of the Qin empire, as represented in the imperial inscriptions.

Similarly, filial piety as a virtue of political loyalty appears not only with the *Xiaojing* “at the end of Qin or in early Han” times (p. 358) but is forcefully argued in the “Xiao xing” 孝行 chapter of the *Lüshi chunqiu*. In pre-imperial times, the core of the canon was valid across most doctrinal differences; and during the Western Han, official scholarship was able to channel various currents of thought and practice into a unified vision of learning: moral ideas associated with Confucius or Mencius; principles of government developed by Han Fei and other theoreticians of statecraft; *yin-yang* and Five Phases cosmology traceable back to the *Yijing* but also to Zou Yan 鄒衍 (305–240 B.C.); historical scholarship and poetic learning; and divination and omen interpretation. The compelling force of the canon lies in the fact that it transcends partial doctrines and hence embraces the learning of various provinces. (Note that since the times of Han Wudi, it was the common practice, proposed by the chancellor Gongsun Hong 公孫弘 [200–121 B.C.], that scholars and students could focus on only one canonical book,⁶⁵ a policy that was changed only in Eastern Han times, when scholars were required to comprehend all five canons.⁶⁶) As noted above, no particular philosophical doctrine became victorious in late Western Han times, but instead it was the imperial structure as such that triumphed, embodied in scholars of very different fields of expertise.

In his final chapter, “The Empire of Writing,” Lewis returns to the establishment and triumph of the canon, this time placing the issue in a broader historical scope. He argues that “the roots for an imperial literary policy were laid in the Qin” (p. 339) and mentions the Qin imperial policies relating to the unification of the script, the ban on private learning, and the erection of the stelae on the mountains in the newly conquered regions as important steps in this process. To explain Han Wudi’s decision to establish both the canon and the imperial academy where it should be studied, Lewis develops a string of valuable considerations on early Han intellectual trends (including *huanglao* 黃老), the emperor’s personal situation as a young ruler, his early education by *ru* tutors, and his efforts to make the imperial court the true center of culture and learning and thus to eclipse the princely courts that until then had attracted the most talented thinkers and writers. At the same time, Lewis provides the crucial observation that this

measure “did not indicate any commitment to the Confucian program, nor did it prevent him from treating the *Chu ci* as a canonical text and ordering the king of Huainan to write a commentary for it. Although the *ru* curriculum had received state sanction, it was far from dominating the intellectual field of the Han empire” (p. 351). One cannot overemphasize this latter point, which to some extent reverses the traditional account of Han intellectual history.

I even would go further and propose that Han Wudi consciously left aside the canon that was already there: despite all contrary claims that arose later during the Western Han, there can be little doubt that canonical learning enjoyed official protection at both the Qin and the early Han courts, that the Qin imperial court contributed substantially to the formation of the “Confucian” canon, and that both the imperial stelae and the early Han ancestral hymns at the court of Han Gaozu 漢高祖 (r. 202–195 B.C.) were projects of scholarly collaboration based on the learning of texts like the *Songs* and the *Documents*.⁶⁷ By contrast, it is astonishing to realize how the canon played no role whatsoever in the composition of Han Wudi’s state sacrificial hymns, that is, his own foremost texts of imperial representation to the cosmic powers.⁶⁸

Such is the scope of *Writing and Authority in Early China*. Altogether, this work—much in canonical fashion—transcends partial interests concerned with the philosophical, historical, or philological analysis of individual works. Instead, it concerns itself with the underlying fundamentals of early Chinese textuality as such. As the early Chinese canon systematized the world, Lewis’ account systematizes with great authority the study of early Chinese intellectual history. This comprehensive account with its new interest in the textuality of early China appears at an auspicious moment in the development of our field: ever more spectacular manuscripts from late pre-imperial and early imperial tombs appear continuously on the archaeological record, either confirming or challenging but always enriching the received textual tradition.⁶⁹ At the same time, these finds are paralleled by no less sensational excavations of material remnants of the early ritual tradition.⁷⁰ Since both manuscripts and ritual objects emerge from the same culture, and literally from the same tombs, future scholarship will need to examine one in the light of the other. For this endeavor, Mark Lewis has provided us with a broad and deep encyclopedic inventory of the textual tradition and its scholarship. For years to come, *Writing and Authority in Early China* will serve as a landmark; written in the midst of the current surge of early China studies, this bold, highly imaginative, and at the same time meticulously researched work will stimulate a rapidly accelerating number of issues to be raised. None of them—like the few points that I offered above—can possibly diminish Lewis’ achievement. Students of early China will find numerous occasions to learn from the book, to comment on it, and to argue with it—simply because it bears on virtually every-

thing that is currently done in this field. There is no other single-handed account of early Chinese intellectual or cultural history to be compared to this book.

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NOTES

1. Mark Lewis himself has raised this issue in his recent article "The Feng and Shan Sacrifices of Emperor Wu of the Han," in *State and Court Ritual in China*, ed. Joseph P. McDermott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 65–66.
2. Nothing documents these developments more convincingly than the pages of the leading journal in the field, *Early China*, which is approaching its silver jubilee soon and which in both quality and international engagement is second to none. Another—no less ambitious and promising—enterprise has just been launched with the first volume of the *Journal of East Asian Archaeology*.
3. See Mark Edward Lewis, *Sanctioned Violence in Early China* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990).
4. David N. Keightley, "Late Shang Divination: The Magico-Religious Legacy," in *Explorations in Early Chinese Cosmology*, ed. Henry Rosemont, Jr. *Journal of the American Academy of Religion Studies* 50, no. 2 (1984): 13–14.
5. Keightley, *Sources of Shang History: The Oracle-Bone Inscriptions of Bronze Age China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 117.
6. On the verifications, see Keightley, *Sources of Shang History*, pp. 42–44, 118–119. Recently, Keightley has analyzed interesting cases of early (Wu Ding 武丁 period) verifications that contradict the king's prognostications—e.g., registering rain on other days than predicted; see his "Theology and the Writing of History: Truth and the Ancestors in the Wu Ding Records," *Journal of East Asian Archaeology* 1 (1999): 207–230. Such (admittedly rare) cases raise fundamental questions about the issue of writing and authority with respect to the oracle bones; by incising the verification, the scribes appear as potentially undermining the king's abilities in communicating with the spirits; at least, as Keightley phrases it, they "could quite easily have manipulated the record far more extensively in the king's favor" (p. 218). However, the contradictions are always only indirect—e.g., mentioning the days on which it indeed rained; they refrain from explicitly stating that on the days for which the king had prognosticated rain, it actually did not rain. I am not sure how to explain such cases of writing "the truth." As Keightley points out, it would be precipitate to view them as "delegitimizing" the king; the Shang must have had ways to rationalize "failure" in divination.
7. On cultural memory in early societies, see Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1992).
8. Edward L. Shaughnessy, *Sources of Western Zhou History: Inscribed Bronze Vessels* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 176–177.
9. This, again, is typical of writing in early traditional societies; see Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis*, pp. 71–72, 83–86.
10. See Keightley, *Sources of Shang History*, pp. 95–96.
11. All these various features are conveniently summarized in Keightley, *Sources of Shang History*, pp. 46, 54, 56, 76–77, 83–84, 89.

12. See my *The Stele Inscriptions of Ch'in Shih-huang: Text and Ritual in Early Chinese Imperial Representation* (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 2000), pp. 140–147, and my “*Shi jing* 詩經 Songs as Performance Texts: A Case Study of ‘Chu ci’ 楚茨 (‘Thorny Caltrop’),” *Early China* 25 (forthcoming in 2000).

13. See Lothar von Falkenhausen, “Issues in Western Zhou Studies: A Review Article,” *Early China* 18 (1993): 152–156.

14. See my *Die Hymnen der chinesischen Staatsopfer: Literatur und Ritual in der politischen Repräsentation von der Han-Zeit bis zu den Sechs Dynastien* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1997), pp. 17–20 passim, and my “*Shi jing* 詩經 Songs as Performance Texts.”

15. For this function of ritual language see Whade T. Wheelock, “The Problem of Ritual Language: From Information to Situation,” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 50, no. 1 (1982): 49–71.

16. *Xiaojing zhushu* 孝經註疏, *Shisan jing zhushu fu jiaokan ji* 十三經注疏附校勘記 ed. (1815; reprint, Beijing: Zhonghua, 1987), 6.18b.

17. David Cannadine, “Divine Rites of Kings,” in *Rituals of Royalty: Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies*, ed. David Cannadine and Simon Price (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 19.

18. *Chunqiu Zuo zhuan zhengyi* 春秋左傳正義, *Shisan jing zhushu fu jiaokan ji* ed., 27.209b (*Cheng* 成 13). I follow Shaughnessy’s translation in his “Military Histories of Early China: A Review Article,” *Early China* 21 (1996): 159.

19. Elsewhere, I have argued in favor of the latter model, trying to demonstrate that this process did not reach its fulfillment until Eastern Han times. See my “Ritual, Text, and the Formation of the Canon: Historical Transitions of *Wen* in Early China,” *T’oung Pao* 87 (2001).

20. Rosalind Thomas, *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1992] 1995), p. 62; on the case of Egypt, see Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis*, pp. 167–195 passim.

21. For a new translation and analysis of these inscriptions dating from around 700 and 600 B.C., see my *The Stele Inscriptions of Ch'in Shih-huang*, pp. 59–105.

22. See Wolfgang Behr, “Reimende Bronzeinschriften und die Entstehung der chinesischen Endreimdichtung” (Ph.D. diss., J. W. Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, 1996), pp. 418–424.

23. According to the individual accounts in chapter 6 of the *Shiji* 史記, the eulogies of the Qin imperial stela were invariably first recited (*song* 誦) and only then carved into stone to be set up on the top of sacred mountains. In late Western Han times, Yang Xiong’s 揚雄 (53 B.C.–A.D. 18) inscriptions (*ming* 銘) were recited to the emperor; see Qian Yi 錢繹, *Fangyan jianshu* 方言箋疏, 2 vols. (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji, 1984), 13.53a.

24. See also his earlier discussion in Lewis, *Sanctioned Violence in Early China*, pp. 43–50, 67–80.

25. See Susan R. Weld, “The Covenant Texts from Houma and Wenxian,” in *New Sources of Early Chinese History: An Introduction to the Reading of Inscriptions and Manuscripts*, ed. Edward L. Shaughnessy (Berkeley: The Society for the Study of Early China and The Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1997), pp. 156–157.

26. In addition to the sources mentioned by Lewis, a valuable new study of Western Zhou bronze inscriptions bearing land contracts is Ulrich Lau, *Quellenstudien zur Landvergabe und Bodenübertragung in der westlichen Zhou-Dynastie (1045?–771 v. Chr.)* (Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Serica, 1999). While not being records of the written laws proper, these inscriptions record the applications of rules, possibly laws, in the form of a contract.

27. For a summary of the relevant scholarship, and for an attempt to integrate both Qin traditionalism and repression into one coherent picture, see my *The Stele Inscriptions of Ch'in Shih-huang*, chap. 5.
28. See David N. Keightley, "The Religious Commitment: Shang Theology and the Genesis of Chinese Political Culture," *History of Religions* 17 (1978): 211–224.
29. See, e.g., A. C. Graham, *Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China* (La Salle: Open Court, 1989), pp. 270–273.
30. See my *Die Hymnen der chinesischen Staatsopfer*, pp. 36–38.
31. Cf. the instruments from the Zeng Hou Yi 曾侯乙 and the Mawangdui 馬王堆 tombs, which are almost three hundred years apart from each other.
32. See Steven Van Zoeren, *Poetry and Personality: Reading, Exegesis, and Hermeneutics in Traditional China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 17–51.
33. A much later example of exactly such textual production of a "master" is the *Zhongshuo* 中說, attributed to Wang Tong 王通 (584?–617), as demonstrated by Ding Xiang Warner, "What's in a Name: An Examination of Forms of Address in Wang Tong's *Zhongshuo* (Discourses of the Mean)" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Oriental Society, Portland, 12–15 March 2000).
34. See *Liji zhengyi* 禮記正義, *Shisan jing zhushu fu jiaokan ji* ed., 49.378c–379a.
35. Nothing suggests that these are the particular books *Shijing* and *Shangshu* in their received versions. On the contrary, just because the received texts very likely went through the editorial hands of the Qin imperial erudites, the "songs" and "documents" circulating outside the imperial court, while belonging to the same generic categories of writings, might have included different texts or versions particularly suitable for criticizing the new rule and challenging its official representation with their own versions of "songs" and "documents"; for this, and for the role of official *ru* scholarship at the Qin imperial court, see my *The Stele Inscriptions of Ch'in Shih-huang*, sec. 5.3.
36. See Jens Østergård Petersen, "Which Books Did the First Emperor of Ch'in Burn? On the Meaning of *Pai Chia* in Early Chinese Sources," *Monumenta Serica* 43 (1995): 1–52.
37. See Huang Hui 黃暉, *Lun heng jiaoshi* 論衡校釋 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1990), 28.1159.
38. For the relevant arguments, see Chen Mengjia 陳夢家, *Shangshu tonglun* 尚書通論 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1985), pp. 135–146, and Jiang Shanguo 蔣善國, *Shangshu zongshu* 尚書綜述 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji, 1988), pp. 140–168; on *ru* scholarship at the Ch'in imperial court, see Kanaya Osamu 金谷治, *Shin Kan shisōshi kenkyū* 秦漢思想史研究, 2d rev. ed. (Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1992), pp. 230–257.
39. See Kanaya Osamu, *Shin Kan shisōshi kenkyū*, pp. 353–374.
40. For the whole argument, including references to the relevant modern scholarship, see my *The Stele Inscriptions of Ch'in Shih-huang*, pp. 183–196.
41. One should note here that there is one, and only one, other major attempt at a theory of textual production in Warring States times, namely the work of E. Bruce and A. Taeko Brooks as published with *The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and His Successors* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) and continuously discussed on the related e-mail list. For a critical assessment of the Brookses' work, see John Makeham's feature article in *China Review International* 6, no. 1 (1999): 1–33.
42. See Falkenhausen, "Issues in Western Zhou Studies," pp. 145–172.
43. See my "*Shi jing* 詩經 Songs as Performance Texts."

44. The notion of the "Three Kings" or "Eras" and "Five Emperors" or (in the *Shang jun shu*) "Hegemons" is not completely absent in pre-imperial writings, but I am aware of only three possible pre-Qin passages where it is related to the idea of change: chapter 14 of the *Zhuangzi* 莊子, "Tianyun" 天運; chapter 47 of the *Guanzi* 管子; and the "Records of Music" ("Yueji" 樂記) in the *Liji*—all of which are most likely Western Han products. For the *Zhuangzi* chapter, see A. C. Graham, *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), pp. 313–321; for the *Guanzi* chapter, see Luo Genze 羅根澤, *Guanzi tanyuan* 管子探源 (Taipei: Liren Shuju, 1982), pp. 101–105, and W. Allyn Rickett, *Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China*, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 170; for the "Yueji," see my "A Note on the Authenticity and Ideology of *Shih-chi* 24, 'The Book on Music,'" *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 119, no. 4 (1999): 673–677.

45. For the full discussion, and for the same (although less intensely argued) idea in other texts, see my "Changing with the Times: The Rhetoric of Ritual and History in Early Imperial China" (in preparation). An earlier version of this has been presented under the title "Changing with the Times": The 'Confucian' Career of a 'Legalist' Dogma in Western Han Ritualism" (presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, San Diego, 9–12 March 2000).

46. See David Schaberg, "Foundations of Chinese Historiography: Literary Representation in *Zuo zhuan* and *Guoyu*" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1996), and Yuri Pines, "Aspects of Intellectual Development in the Chunqiu Period, 722–453" (Ph.D. diss., Hebrew University, 1997). See also Schaberg, "Remonstrance in Eastern Zhou Historiography," *Early China* 22 (1997): 133–179; Schaberg, "Song and the Historical Imagination in Early China," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 59 (1999): 305–361; and Pines, "Intellectual Change in the Chunqiu Period: The Reliability of the Speeches in the *Zuo Zhuan* as Sources of Chunqiu Intellectual History," *Early China* 22 (1997): 77–132.

47. Jeffrey Riegel, "Eros, Introversion, and the Beginnings of *Shijing* Commentary," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 57 (1997): 171.

48. See *Mao shi zhengyi* 毛詩正義, *Shih-san-jing zhushu fu jiaokan ji* ed., 18–3.301b (no. 260). Other examples in the "Elegantiae" ("Ya" 雅) sections include *Mao shi* 9–2.138c (no. 162), 12–1.173c (no. 191), 12–3.187c (no. 199), 12–3.188c (no. 200), 13–1.195a (no. 204), 17–4.279b (no. 252), 18–2.293a (no. 257), and 18–3.299c (no. 259).

49. For a fuller discussion of both the bronze inscription and the "imprecations," see my *The Stele Inscriptions of Ch'in Shih-huang*, pp. 141–142 passim.

50. See *Mao shi zhengyi* 20–1.341a; see also Ch'en Shih-hsiang, "The *Shih-ching*: Its Generic Significance in Chinese Literary History and Poetics," *Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica* 39 (1969): 371–413.

51. See my "*Shi jing* 詩經 Songs as Performance Texts."

52. See Hellmut Wilhelm, *Heaven, Earth, and Man in the Book of Changes* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), pp. 207–209. See also Lewis' references to the works by Richard Kunst and Edward L. Shaughnessy. The most extensive treatment of the subject is Huang Yushun 黃玉順, *Yijing guge kaoshi* 易經古歌考釋 (Chengdu: Bashu Shushe, 1995).

53. William G. Boltz, *The Origin and Early Development of the Chinese Writing System* (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1994), p. 151.

54. In the *Hanshu* 漢書, altogether ten "monographs" (*zhi* 志) embody the imperial administrative order; for the "Lüli zhi," see *Hanshu*, 6th. ed. (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1987), 21A–B.955–

1026, where the calendar together with all other measurements is derived from the musical pitches (see esp. 21A.966–70). Cf. also Kenneth DeWoskin, “Early Chinese Music and the Origins of Aesthetic Terminology,” in *Theories of the Arts in China*, ed. Susan Bush and Christian Murck (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983): “During the Han, typical discussions of music were eclectic, being primarily concerned with establishing the significant correspondences between music as a system and other orderly systems. . . . The eminent Han texts . . . bring acoustics, metrology, geography, and calendrics together in a numerological web that bears serious implications for all questions of politics, ritual, and morality. . . . All aspects of life are fitted into a colossal cosmic taxonomy, keyed to the musical gamut and calendar. It was a system built with a passion for order and an obvious affection for complexity” (pp. 188–194). See also Joseph Needham and Kenneth Girdwood Robinson, *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol. 4, *Physics and Physical Technology, Part I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 172–176, 199–202.

55. See *Lüshi chunqiu* 呂氏春秋, *Sibu congkan* ed., 5.8b–9a; also Kenneth DeWoskin, *A Song for One or Two: Music and the Concept of Art in Early China* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies, 1982), pp. 59–61.

56. See John B. Henderson, *Scripture, Canon, and Commentary: A Comparison of Confucian and Western Exegesis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); *Rethinking Scripture: Essays From a Comparative Perspective*, ed. Miriam Levering (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1989); Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis*, esp. pp. 103–129; *Kanon und Zensur*, ed. Aleida and Jan Assmann (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1987), esp. the Assmanns’ “Kanon und Zensur als kultursoziologische Kategorien,” pp. 7–46.

57. See Kamatani Takeshi 釜谷武志, “Fu ni nankai na ji ga oi no wa naze ka: Zen-Kan ni okeru fu no yomarekata” 賦に難解な字が多いのはなぜか: 前漢における賦の讀まれかた, *Nihon Chügoku Gakkai hō* 日本中國學會報 48 (1996): 16–30.

58. See David R. Knechtges, trans., *Wen xuan, or Selections of Refined Literature*, 3 vols. (to date) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982–1996). For a lucid discussion of the primarily phonetic nature of the rhyming and alliterative binomes, see Knechtges, *Wen xuan*, 2:1–13, and Knechtges, “Problems of Translating Descriptive Binomes in the *Fu*,” *Tamkang Review* 15 (1984–1985): 329–347.

59. See David R. Knechtges and Jerry Swanson, “Seven Stimuli for the Prince: the *Ch’i-fa* of Mei Ch’eng,” *Monumenta Serica* 29 (1970–1971): 99–116.

60. See Yves Hervouet, *Le chapitre 117 du Che-ki (Biographie de Sseu-ma Siang-jou)* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), and Hervouet, “La valeur relative des textes du Che ki et du Han chou,” in *Mélanges de sinologie offerts à Monsieur Paul Demiéville*, vol. 2 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1974), pp. 55–76.

61. In *Hanshu* 30.1720, he is credited with a lexicon (?) of the title *Fan jiang* 凡將; nothing is known about its nature and function.

62. *Hanshu* 30.1755.

63. See David R. Knechtges, *The Han Rhapsody: A Study of the Fu of Yang Hsiung (53 B.C.–A.D. 18)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 12–13, and my *The Stele Inscriptions of Ch’in Shih-huang*, pp. 143–144.

64. See, e.g., Kuang Heng’s memorial on the imperial altar for the worship of Taiyi 太一 (“Grand Unity”) in *Hanshu* 25B.1256; see also Michael Loewe, *Crisis and Conflict in Han China, 104 BC to AD 9* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974), pp. 154–192, and my “Ritual, Text, and the Formation of the Canon.”

65. See *Hanshu* 88.3594.

66. See Michael Nylan, "The Chin wen / Ku wen Controversy in Han Times," *T'oung Pao* 80 (1994): 117.

67. See my *The Stele Inscriptions of Ch'in Shih-huang*, chap. 5, and my "Ritual, Text, and the Formation of the Canon."

68. See my *Die Hymnen der chinesischen Staatsopfer*, pp. 174–303.

69. Within the shortest time, the recently published late fourth century B.C. bamboo strips from Guodian 郭店 (see *Guodian Chu mu zhujian* 郭店楚墓竹簡 [Beijing: Wenwu, 1998]) have provoked a series of conferences and the appearance of books and articles that already count in the hundreds. The significance of the Guodian find, however, may soon be surpassed by another large number of bamboo strips that the Shanghai Museum has purchased on the Hong Kong antiquarian market and is going to publish soon.

70. Here, one immediately thinks of the mesmerizing beauty and technological perfection of the Zeng Hou Yi tomb, which with its unique, partly gold-inlaid bell inscriptions on musical theory and terminology bears directly on the issue of writing in early China in that these texts not only identify a full-fledged tonal system but, equally important, refer to different regional terminologies for these tones, displaying a consciousness of both cultural unity and linguistic diversity in fifth-century China; see Lothar von Falkenhausen, *Suspended Music: Chime-Bells in the Culture of Bronze Age China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 280–309.